When Courts Should Ignore Statutory Text by Cross, Jesse M.
University of South Carolina 
Scholar Commons 
Faculty Publications Law School 
Fall 2018 
When Courts Should Ignore Statutory Text 
Jesse M. Cross 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub 
 Part of the Law Commons 
2018]  453 
 
WHEN COURTS SHOULD IGNORE STATUTORY TEXT 
 
Jesse M. Cross * 
Abstract. Statutory interpreters often rely upon a fundamen-
tal assumption: namely, that every word of a statute is meant to 
be read—and given legal force—by the courts. This assumption 
unites both textualists and intentionalists, and it has been invoked 
by Justices as diverse as Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens, 
and Justice Scalia—the last of whom called it a “cardinal rule of 
statutory interpretation.” It underpins at least nine separate can-
ons of statutory interpretation, and it even shapes how courts in-
terpret legislative documents beyond statutes. It is difficult to im-
agine a more central assumption in statutory interpretation. 
As this Article shows, however, this assumption is incorrect. 
Congress routinely inserts language into statutes that it hopes 
courts will ignore. Rather than addressing courts, this language 
targets one of three nonjudicial audiences: interest groups, exec-
utive agencies, or nonpartisan congressional offices.  
This Article—written by a former drafter of congressional 
statutes—documents this legislative practice. Moreover, it argues 
that, to the extent that courts want to act as faithful agents of Con-
gress, they should refrain from interpreting and applying this text 
that Congress intends solely for a nonjudicial audience. The Arti-
cle outlines a methodology that courts can use to this end—a 
methodology that can accurately identify statutory text Congress 
wants courts to ignore. 
In addition to showing that courts are reaching incorrect re-
sults in important cases—and providing a methodological solu-
tion to this problem—the Article’s analysis also holds theoretical 
lessons for the major schools of thought in statutory interpreta-
tion. For intentionalists, it provides a new theory about how 
courts should weigh legislative materials (including statutory text, 
appropriations committee reports, and CBO cost estimates). For 
textualists, it shows that many canons of construction must be 
modified or discarded, and it also rebuts the foundational notion 
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that statutory text can be divorced from intent or audience. And, 
for public-choice theorists, it challenges the central idea that leg-
islators are mere agents for interest groups—an idea rebutted by 
the discovery of a drafting practice that purposefully carves out 
spaces for principled governance in statutes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the field of statutory interpretation, both textualist and intentionalist 
interpreters consistently rely upon a basic, shared idea: namely, that courts 
should interpret and enforce every word of a statute. 1 Known as the “surplus-
age canon,”2 the “rule against surplusage,”3 or the “rule against superflui-
ties,”4 it is an idea that has received deep and sustained support in the Amer-
ican legal community. It has been invoked by Justices as diverse as Chief 
Justice Marshall, 5 Justice Stevens, 6 and Justice Scalia7—the last of whom 
called it “the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation.”8 It underpins at least 
nine separate canons of statutory interpretation, and it shapes even how 
courts interpret legislative documents beyond statutes.9 It is difficult to im-
agine a more central rule in the field of statutory interpretation. 
Why has this rule garnered such widespread support? For many inter-
preters, it is justified by the idea that, by applying the rule, they are giving 
effect to congressional intent.10 Congress presumably intends for every word 
  
 1 As Caleb Nelson puts it: “[T]extualists (like all other interpreters) embrace the presumption 
against surplusage.” Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 355 (2005). To use the 
vocabulary of speech-act theory, these interpreters assume that statutory text addresses the courts through 
what is called an “indirect speech act,” which relies on readers’ background knowledge of constitutional 
structure to know that the statute, while not explicitly addressing the courts, nonetheless operates as an 
instruction to the courts to enforce its statutory directives. See JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND 
MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS 30 (1979). 
 2 E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 174 (2012). 
 3 E.g., TOBIAS A. DORSEY, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER’S DESKBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 85 (2006). 
 4 E.g., id. 
 5 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819). 
 6 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697–98 (1995). 
 7 Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 8 Id. 
 9 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 107 (Negative-Implication Canon), 112 (Mandatory/Per-
missive Canon), 132 (Presumption of Nonexclusive “Include”), 174 (Surplusage Canon), 195 (Associ-
ated-Words Canon), 199 (Ejusdem Generis Canon), 217 (Prefatory-Materials Canon), 221 (Title-and-
Headings Canon), 225 (Interpretive-Direction Canon); Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpreta-
tion, and the Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What 
They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 182 (2017) (using the CBO canon as a potential 
starting point for statutory interpretation); e.g., infra note 156. 
 10 See, e.g., Melissa Davenport, Comment, Risky Business: The FDA Bans Ephedra, and Gets a Leg 
Up on the Dietary Supplement Industry, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 635, 642 (2007) (referring to “the ‘rule 
against surplusage,’ which suggests a court will better realize congressional intent by giving meaning to 
every word used in a statute”); Jacob R. Karabell, The Implementation of “Balanced Diversity” Through 
the Class Action Fairness Act, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 313 n.82 (2009) (“[T]he rule against surplusage 
presumes that Congress intends to give every aspect of a statute meaning.”); Brian G. Slocum, Comment, 
The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambi-
guity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 827–28 (2010) (“[T]he rule against 
surplusage[] assumes that Congress intends for each statutory term to have meaning.”). 
 
2018] WHEN COURTS SHOULD IGNORE STATUTORY TEXT 457 
of its statutory commands to be backed by the threat of judicial enforcement, 
the logic goes—and so courts, by giving effect to every word, are simply 
acting as faithful agents of Congress. 11 In this way, the rule against surplus-
age typically is anchored in an assumption that Congress views the courts as 
the intended audience for every word of its statutes. 12 
As the following pages explain, however, this assumption is incorrect. 
When Congress drafts statutes today, it frequently inserts passages that it 
hopes courts will ignore. Indeed, having worked for six years as a drafter of 
congressional statutes, the Author of this Article personally inserted many 
such passages into federal legislation.13 Rather than addressing the courts, 
these passages were designed to speak exclusively to nonjudicial audiences. 
By interpreting these passages of statutory text as though they were in-
tended to contribute to court-enforceable commands, courts have failed to 
accurately ascertain the intended import of these passages—a failure that pro-
duces contorted interpretations of otherwise straightforward statutes. This 
failure is problematic, for it prevents courts from acting as faithful agents of 
Congress—an interpretive ideal that the vast majority of courts claim to em-
brace. 
This Article documents the existence of these passages of statutory text 
that Congress does not intend for judicial audiences, and it outlines the other 
audiences that Congress seeks to reach with this text. Specifically, it observes 
that there are three nonjudicial audiences that Congress regularly addresses 
via such passages. 
The first of these audiences is constituent groups—in particular, special-
interest groups. Statutory text aimed exclusively at this audience serves a 
specific function: it allows these constituent groups to hear their values ech-
oed in the text of congressional statutes. In so doing, the text gives constituent 
groups the sense that they partake in an ongoing relationship with legisla-
tors—a relationship wherein their commitments and values are heard and 
considered. As such, this text can achieve its desired effect without com-
manding or binding any party to a certain course of action. Consequently, the 
text need not be interpreted or enforced by courts in order to achieve its de-
sired effect. In the following pages, this brand of constituent-targeted lan-
guage will be referred to as expressive rhetoric. 
The second alternative audience for congressional statutes is executive 
agencies. As Professor Edward L. Rubin previously has noted, Congress’s 
statutory directives sometimes are intended solely for the agencies that will 
  
 11 For a textualist embracing this intent-based logic of the rule against surplusage, see, for example, 
Nelson, supra note 1, at 355. 
 12 See id. (“The reason for this presumption is simple: the fact that members of [Congress] bothered 
to include the second provision sheds light on what they probably intended the first provision to mean.”). 
 13 The Author worked as a Counsel in the Office of the Legislative Counsel for the House of Rep-
resentatives, the main statutory drafting office in the House of Representatives, from 2011 to 2017.  
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implement the directives. 14 Put differently, Congress does not always intend 
to use court-enforceable commands as the vehicle by which to direct agency 
action. There is a simple reason why it does not: agencies are dependent on 
Congress in many ways. This reality makes agencies attentive not only to the 
policies that Congress requires the agencies to implement, but also to those 
policies that Congress merely suggests or directs the agencies to implement. 
Following Rubin, this suggestion-driven statutory language will be labeled 
in the following pages as directive rhetoric. 15  
As this Article shows, Congress uses specific drafting techniques to in-
tegrate directive rhetoric into statutory text. These techniques, while unan-
ticipated by Rubin, are identical to the techniques Congress uses in the con-
text of expressive rhetoric. Importantly, they are techniques that courts can 
isolate and identify in the effort to parse Congress’s intentions more accu-
rately. 
The final alternative audience of congressional statutory rhetoric is the 
collection of nonpartisan offices of Congress—offices that assist (and some-
times intervene in) the legislative process. Statutory text aimed at this audi-
ence is not focused on the goal of implementing a particular policy in the real 
world, but rather on soliciting a certain answer or response from one of these 
offices. This rhetoric will be referred to in this Article as institutionally in-
quisitive rhetoric. 
If courts genuinely wish to discover and enforce congressional intent, 
this Article will argue, they should refrain from interpreting and enforcing 
statutory text intended solely for one of these three audiences. To many 
judges and scholars, however, the idea of acknowledging nonbinding rhetoric 
in congressional statutes may seem disconcerting. It may seem to invite a 
world in which judges are empowered to ignore broad swaths of congres-
sional statutes. Once judges may acknowledge the presence of nonoperative 
rhetoric in statutes, it might be asked, what is to prevent them from using this 
power dishonestly? What will prevent judges, in other words, from using this 
power to ignore any statutory provision that conflicts with their policy pref-
erences? 
The answer to these concerns is found in the narrow, responsible man-
ner in which Congress addresses its nonjudicial audiences. As the following 
pages explain, Congress uses its alternative rhetorics only in specific, identi-
fiable statutory locations—namely, in locations in which established drafting 
conventions have created the inevitability, or at least the high likelihood, of 
statutory redundancy. In the following pages, these locations are referred to 
as redundancy-encouraging features of statutes. In this use of redundancy-
encouraging features, Congress takes advantage of redundancies as locations 
  
 14 Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 374 
(1989).  
 15 When the present Article refers to “directive rhetoric,” it is using the term “directive” in the sense 
used by Rubin, not in the broader sense used by the speech-act theorist John Searle, despite its occasional 
reliance upon Searle’s theorizations. See id. at 380. 
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that allow it to bifurcate a single statutory directive, splitting that directive 
into statutory text aimed at the courts, on the one hand, and statutory text 
aimed at nonjudicial audiences, on the other hand. Consequently, a power to 
parse Congress’s different rhetorics does not translate into a freewheeling 
power that would permit courts to ignore any statutory text they find unpal-
atable. Rather, it would sanction an interpretive methodology endorsed in the 
following pages—one that, above all, requires courts to bring a new form of 
interpretive scrutiny to the redundancy-encouraging features that populate 
federal statutes. 
In addition to showing that courts have reached incorrect results in im-
portant cases, this Article—through its analysis of Congress’s different rhet-
orics—offers several theoretical contributions to the field of statutory inter-
pretation. A few of these are worth noting at the outset. First, it posits a new 
hierarchy of legislative materials. Under this hierarchy, a court gives weight 
to those materials that it has reason to believe were drafted with the courts as 
their intended audience—and it would adopt a new method for investigating 
whether this belief is valid. Unlike the method adopted by most textualists, 
this method does not automatically assume that all statutory text is intended 
to address the courts. Unlike the method adopted by many intentionalists, it 
does not presume that every congressional expression of intent is meant to 
operate as a guide to the courts in their interpretive endeavor. Instead, it re-
quires courts to conduct an additional inquiry once they have identified a 
congressional action or decision (such as the decision to insert a word or 
phrase into statutory text). They must ask: what type of rhetorical intent mo-
tivated this action or decision? Was the action or decision motivated by a 
legal desire to achieve enforcement in the courts? Or did Congress instead 
pursue this goal purely for expressive, directive, or institutionally inquisitive 
reasons?  
Second, the Article suggests that many of the semantic canons are being 
misapplied by the courts. While many of these canons do seem grounded in 
legitimate theories about language usage, the canons go astray by layering 
these linguistic theories upon a false assumption: namely, that every word of 
a federal statute is designed to contribute to a court-enforceable rule. The 
result is that seemingly intuitive canons are applied in ways that misconstrue 
congressional intent. By attempting to redress these misguided efforts, this 
Article has implications for a host of canons of interpretation which are ad-
dressed in the following pages. These include the rule against surplusage, the 
ejusdem generis canon, the expressio unius canon, the noscitur a sociis 
canon, the title-and-headings canon, the mandatory/permissive canon, the 
definitions canon, the presumption of nonexclusive “include” canon, and the 
CBO canon.16 In most instances, the lesson is that any court aspiring to act 
as a faithful agent of Congress should not apply these canons when there is 
  
 16 The abbreviation “CBO” refers to the Congressional Budget Office, an office that provides cost 
estimates of legislation for Congress. For a discussion of the CBO canon, see infra note 231–235 and 
accompanying text. 
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compelling evidence that the statutory text at issue was written solely as ex-
pressive, directive, or institutionally inquisitive rhetoric. 
Third, the analysis of expressive rhetoric in Part I rebuts a central tenet 
of public-choice theory—a theory which asserts that legislators are utterly 
beholden to special-interest groups. As Part I explains, legislators use expres-
sive rhetoric to placate interest groups by addressing their rhetorical needs in 
nonoperative statutory text. In so doing, legislators seek to insulate operative 
statutory text from these interest group needs—an approach which, ideally, 
allows this operative text to articulate rules that are more public-regarding. 
The Article therefore suggests that legislators are attempting to negotiate a 
world of interest-group politics in a way that still allows them to create spaces 
for good governance. In this regard, it supports the work of those such as 
Professor Richard Fenno who have criticized the public-choice model by ar-
guing that legislators do more than simply rubber-stamp the decisions made 
by interest groups.17 Further, it observes that when courts disregard this lin-
guistic maneuver by Congress, they not only betray their goal of faithful 
agency; rather, they also allow interest-group politics to disrupt the national 
political system even beyond the level deemed acceptable by Congress. 
Fourth, the Article rejects a notion that Justice Scalia, in particular, 
propagated: the idea that the meaning of a statute can be adequately under-
stood in isolation from any analysis of intent or audience. The interpretive 
theory advocated by Justice Scalia returned to an idea that gained prominence 
among formalist literary theorists in the 1950s and 1960s: namely, that writ-
ten texts are autonomous creations that rely on neither author nor audience 
for their essential meaning.18 In response to those formalist theorists, a sub-
sequent generation of literary scholars emerged 19—a generation whose work 
informed this Article. These scholars viewed a text’s cues about its intended 
audience as inseparable from the “meaning” of that text. 20 This Article ac-
cepts the insights offered by these subsequent scholars, and it transposes 
these insights into the field of statutory interpretation. In so doing, this Article 
rejects Justice Scalia’s formalist methodology, and it offers an alternative to 
that methodology. To the extent that this alternative methodology produces 
more compelling interpretations of congressional statutes, it should be taken 
as evidence of the inseparability of authorial intent, text, and audience—and 
consequently as a critique of Justice Scalia’s attempt to quarantine these fac-
tors from each other. 
A number of theoretical insights emerge, therefore, from the vision of 
congressional statutes espoused in the following pages. According to this 
  
 17 See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 44 (1973). 
 18 See, e.g., W.K. WIMSATT, JR. & MONROE C. BEARDSLEY, The Intentional Fallacy, in THE 
VERBAL ICON: STUDIES IN THE MEANING OF POETRY 3, 3 (1954) (“[T]he design or intention of the author 
is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art . . . .”). 
 19 See generally WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF FICTION (1961); Wolfgang Iser, The Reading 
Process: A Phenomenological Approach, 3 NEW LITERARY HIST. 279 (1972). 
 20 See, e.g., BOOTH, supra note 19, at 89–91; Iser, supra note 19, at 279. 
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vision, modern political realities motivate congressional policymakers to use 
statutory text as a vehicle to address multiple audiences. In so doing, these 
policymakers become complex rhetorical actors who employ multiple voices 
in statutes to fulfill the full range of their political needs. If judges genuinely 
desire to act as faithful agents of Congress, it is imperative for them to hear 
Congress’s multiple voices and discern which of those voices truly is ad-
dressed to courts. This Article aims to provide statutory interpreters with the 
tools necessary to accomplish this interpretive task. 
This Article is divided into six Parts. Part I examines Congress’s use of 
expressive rhetoric, Part II looks at directive rhetoric, Part III examines Con-
gress’s tendency to blend expressive rhetoric and directive rhetoric, and Part 
IV examines institutionally inquisitive rhetoric. Finally, Part V provides an 
in-depth examination of an illustrative case, United States v. Jicarilla Apache 
Nation, 21 to demonstrate the need for courts to adopt the methodology out-
lined in this Article.  
I. EXPRESSIVE RHETORIC 
A. Message Bills 
It is widely acknowledged that congressional legislation is designed, at 
least in some instances, to afford benefits to certain constituent groups.22 Ac-
cording to the traditional account, legislation accomplishes this objective 
through a three-step process. 23 First, a bill is enacted into law. Second, the 
bill—because it is enacted into law—instructs the executive and judicial 
branches to implement and enforce the policies that the bill outlines.24 Third, 
the implementation of these policies affords benefits to constituents. 25 Under 
this account, courts and executive agencies are the intended audiences of 
  
 21 564 U.S. 162 (2011).  
 22 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: 
LEGISLATION AND INTERPRETATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 77–78 (2014); see also Trent Lott & 
John Breaux, Want a Functioning Legislative Branch? Bring Back Earmarks., WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/want-a-functioning-legislative-branch-bring-back-ear-
marks/2018/01/24/981b1672-0089-11e8-8acf-ad2991367d9d_story.html (“Members of Congress under-
standably seek to represent their states and districts in the best way possible—including voting for bills 
that benefit constituents directly.”).  
 23 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 22, at 77 (“Under [even] the rosiest versions of pluralism, 
politics is seen as the process by which interest groups seek to satisfy their goals, with each group securing 
the policies they most intensely desire . . . .”) 
 24 Rubin, supra note 14, at 373. 
 25 MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 40 (2d ed. 
1989). 
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statutory text, and while constituents benefit from that text, they receive the 
benefit only via the work of an intermediate actor. 26 
This traditional account ignores a type of bill that is omnipresent in Con-
gress, however: the “message bill.” As a New York Times editorial once ob-
served, message bills are “bills designed not to become law.”27 On the floor 
of Congress, Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton similarly noted of one 
such bill:  
Every Member of the House knows that [the bill under debate] will never see the light of day 
on the other side of the Congress, in the Senate, and will never become law. It is a message 
bill. That is all right. Both sides, when they capture the Congress, participate in message 
bills. 28 
Message bills cannot afford benefits to constituent groups through the con-
ventional three-step process, in other words, for the simple reason that they 
are never enacted into law. 
Despite this fact, however, it is widely acknowledged that message bills 
are drafted and introduced to satisfy constituent groups.29 If message bills’ 
purpose is to provide benefits to constituents, and if they do not accomplish 
this via the typical three-step process, then how do they accomplish this task?  
The answer to this question is embedded in the very label given to these 
bills: they allow legislators to send a “message” directly to constituents. As 
Senator Olympia Snowe put it in the Harvard Journal on Legislation: “Much 
of what occurs in Congress today is what is often called ‘political messag-
ing.’ Rather than putting forward a plausible, realistic solution to a problem, 
members on both sides offer legislation that is designed to make a political 
statement.” 30 For this reason, Members of Congress often analyze the bill by 
examining “the message it sends” to constituents, not by scrutinizing what 
the bill would accomplish upon enactment. 31 As one scholar has observed, 
messaging is properly evaluated not to discover whether it is supported by 
  
 26 See Rubin, supra note 14, at 373, 376. 
 27 Editorial, The Bills to Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
06/08/opinion/the-bills-to-nowhere.html (emphasis added); see also Federal Research and Development: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech. & Space of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 
105th Cong. 12 (1998) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller) (referring to what Sen. Rockefeller “would call a 
message bill as opposed to a passable bill or . . . appropriations effort”). 
 28 160 CONG. REC. H159 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 2014) (statement of Rep. Norton). 
 29 See Senator Olympia J. Snowe, The Effect of Modern Partisanship on Legislative Effectiveness 
in the 112th Congress, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 27 (2013). 
 30 Id. 
 31 144 CONG. REC. H10,178 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Rep. Becerra) (analyzing a bill 
that essentially was a “message bill” that “will not have any practical legal affect [sic] on our laws and 
how we conduct our affairs” in terms of “the message it sends”); see also Sarah Mimms & Billy House, 
House Barely Passes Paul Ryan’s Budget, with 12 Republicans Voting No, NAT’L J. (Apr. 10, 2014, 8:48 
AM), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/59374 (quoting Rep. Massie as saying Paul Ryan’s budget bill 
“is a messaging bill” and analyzing it in terms of “[w]hat it says” to constituents). 
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solid, implementable policy but rather to determine whether the message 
“resonates with what Members of Congress (and their constituents) want to 
hear.”32  
In the case of a message bill, in other words, the text of the bill is itself 
the benefit accorded to constituents. The bill echoes back to constituents the 
views and values that they find meaningful. 33 As such, message bills seek to 
communicate directly to these constituents—which is to say, the statutory 
text of these bills adopts constituents as its directly intended audience. 
Message bills send this “message” to constituents in two ways. First, 
because message bills will never be implemented, these bills can contain pol-
icies that are designed purely to appeal to constituent groups, without regard 
to the practical consequences of implementation. In the following pages, 
these will be referred to as expressive policies. Second, these bills can include 
language that is chosen solely for its vivid ability to communicate policy 
goals to constituents, rather than for its ability to communicate precise policy 
directives to the courts. This will be referred to as expressive rhetoric. 
Since Congress has unilateral power to draft statutory text, message bills 
can achieve this communicative goal without any assistance from the execu-
tive branch or the courts. This is why message bills do not adopt the coordi-
nate branches as intended audiences—and why they never intend to do so. 
Expressive policies and expressive rhetoric only need to speak with a spe-
cific, easily achieved illocutionary force: they express Congress’s awareness 
of constituents’ values, and they do so without directing or commanding that 
agencies or courts take any action in furtherance of these values. 34  
The congressional practice of drafting message bills offers two im-
portant lessons. First, the fact that Members of Congress expend precious 
time and resources producing message bills reveals that Members value the 
opportunity to use statutory text as a vehicle for expressive policies and ex-
pressive rhetoric. It undoubtedly would require less time and effort for Mem-
bers to address constituent groups by inserting these policies and this rhetoric 
  
 32 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Policy and Politics of Immigrant Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 387, 421 (2007); see also The Bills to Nowhere, supra note 27 (noting that message bills 
drafted by Republicans were written “to satisfy the ideological desires of conservative voters,” not to 
enact substantive policies). 
 33 In this sense, legislative text becomes one of the many nonlegislative benefits that Congress pro-
vides to interest groups, a benefit similar to others that Professor Morris Fiorina has documented. Cf. 
FIORINA, supra note 25, at 40. 
 34 The distinction between the illocutionary force of a statement, as opposed to the content of that 
statement, has been laid out in detail by speech-act theorists. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO 
THINGS WITH WORDS 105–06 (2d ed. 1975). Summarizing Professor Austin’s insights, scholars have said: 
“[E]lementary illocutionary acts are of the form F(P): they are composed of a force F and of a proposition 
P. On the one hand, sentences like ‘Please, help me!’ and ‘You will help me’ . . . express . . . the same 
propositional content but different forces. On the other hand, elementary sentences like ‘Is it snowing?’ 
and ‘Are you coming?’ . . . express . . . the same force but different propositional contents.” ESSAYS IN 
SPEECH ACT THEORY 5 (Daniel Vanderveken & Susumu Kubo eds., 2001).  
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into nonlegislative texts (such as press releases). Yet these Members consist-
ently expend the effort necessary to use statutory text as the vehicle for these 
expressive elements, drafting and introducing many message bills in each 
Congress. 35 The prevalence of this practice shows that, for Members, the in-
sertion of these expressive elements into statutory text is a distinct and valu-
able benefit that they can offer to constituents.  
Second, message bills reveal a particular strategy used by Members to 
achieve this expressive goal. This strategy consists of two parts. First, in the 
effort to avoid addressing courts or agencies, these legislators make use of a 
location in statutory text where Congress knows that its rhetoric will not be 
buttressed by an institutional enforcement mechanism. Here, that location is 
the text of statutes that will never be enacted into law. Second, that location 
is used as a hiding place for rhetoric that speaks directly to constituents—and 
in terms that are meaningful to them.  
B. Statutory Redundancies: Congressional Drafters on Expressive  
Rhetoric 
To many judges and scholars, the notion that Congress includes expres-
sive rhetoric and expressive policies in message bills is neither troubling nor 
surprising. After all, this notion does not challenge the basic idea that, when 
it comes to enacted statutes, Congress speaks solely in what, in the following 
pages, will be described as operative legal rhetoric—which is to say, in rhet-
oric that Congress intends courts to interpret and enforce. 
Interpreters who adopt this perspective clearly are correct in one sense: 
Members of Congress do not have the luxury of inserting expressive policies 
into enacted statutes. Regardless of any suspicions that a policy was designed 
to appeal directly to a nonjudicial audience, courts and agencies simply will 
not ignore entire sections of enacted statutes. 36 This is precisely what would 
be required for expressive policies to speak directly to constituents and evade 
enforcement by the courts. Congress undoubtedly is aware of this fact, and 
there is little reason to presume that Congress is including entire provisions 
in enacted statutes that it expects the courts to overlook. 
However, there is strong evidence—in recent drafter interviews, as well 
as in statutory text itself—to support the idea that Congress is inserting 
  
 35 In recent years, some have accused Congress of drafting only message bills. See, e.g., 160 CONG. 
REC. H159 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 2014) (statement of Rep. Norton) (“The problem with the majority in the 
House today is that it only does message bills.”); The Bills to Nowhere, supra note 27 (“This is now the 
pattern of business in the House of Representatives: Spend most of the time passing bills designed not to 
become law . . . .”). 
 36 Scalia and Garner note that “[l]awyers rarely argue that an entire provision should be ignored—
but it does happen.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 175. They cite Fortec Constructors v. United 
States, 760 F.2d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 1985), as an instance of lawyers making such an argument. See id. Scalia 
and Garner add that “[t]he court correctly rejected this argument.” Id. at 176. 
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expressive rhetoric into strategic locations in enacted statutes. 37 First, con-
sider the evidence found in drafter interviews. In their recent survey of con-
gressional drafters, Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman ob-
served: 
[R]espondents [to the survey] . . . pointed out that the political interests of the audience often 
demand redundancy. They told us, for example, that “sometimes politically for compromise 
they must include certain words in the statute—that senator, that constituent, that lobbyist 
wants to see that word”; similarly, they said that “sometimes the lists are in there to satisfy 
groups, certain phrases are needed to satisfy political interests and they might overlap” or that 
“sometimes you have it in there because someone had to see their phrase in the bill to get it 
passed.” One example provided was a statute drafted to cover “medical service providers” that 
had to be amended to include a specific (and redundant) reference to “hospitals” to satisfy 
stakeholders. . . . 
[W]hat respondents told us was . . . that even in short statutes—indeed, even within single sec-
tions of statutes—that terms are often purposefully redundant to satisfy audiences other than 
courts. 38 
In this passage, Gluck and Bressman reveal a congressional drafting 
practice of inserting language into statutes that displays the two hallmarks of 
expressive rhetoric. 39 These hallmarks, it will be recalled, were that (1) the 
inserted language is designed to speak to constituents, not courts; and (2) the 
language is inserted into a statutory location that Congress hopes, and rea-
sonably expects, will allow that rhetoric to evade enforcement by courts. 40  
Consider the first of these hallmarks: that the statutory text at issue is 
designed to speak to constituents, not courts. The respondents to Gluck and 
Bressman’s survey suggest that, on occasion, Congress uses statutory text to 
address an intended audience “other than courts,” an audience that instead 
comprises “constituent[s],” “lobbyist[s],” “[outside] groups,” and “political 
interests.”41 This is precisely the intended audience of message bills.  
Skepticism likely exists, however, as to whether Gluck and Bressman’s 
respondents also point toward statutory text that satisfies the second hallmark 
of expressive rhetoric: namely, that this rhetoric is inserted into a statutory 
location that Congress hopes and expects will evade judicial enforcement. To 
skeptical interpreters, the insertion of a term or phrase into the text of an 
enacted statute inevitably signals a congressional intent to have this term in-
terpreted and enforced by the courts.  
Yet the respondents to Gluck and Bressman’s survey describe a practice 
of inserting this rhetoric specifically into a strategic set of locations within 
  
 37 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Em-
pirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 934–
35 (2013). 
 38 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 39 See id. at 934–36. 
 40 See id. at 934–35. 
 41 Id. (emphasis removed). 
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statutory text: locations of statutory redundancy.42 As Gluck and Bressman 
put it, their respondents pointed toward a drafting practice that involves the 
insertion of “terms [that] are often purposefully redundant” into statutes. 43 
There is no legal reason, of course, why this language must be redundant. If 
constituents insist upon inserting certain terminology into a statute, that ter-
minology could simply be used as the sole articulation of the relevant idea in 
the legislation, rather than in addition to redundant text located elsewhere in 
the bill. Yet Gluck and Bressman’s respondents describe a different drafting 
practice. Why might that be? 
If there is one type of statutory text that Congress might reasonably ex-
pect courts to grudgingly treat as surplusage, it would be redundant text. As 
Justice Scalia and Professor Garner have observed, situations in which 
judges—even textualist judges—must treat statutory terms as redundancies 
are “lamentably common.”44 Put differently, if Members of Congress felt ob-
ligated to insert rhetoric into statutory text that they intended exclusively for 
an audience other than the courts, it makes sense that these Members would 
do so in redundant passages of these statutes, since these passages are fre-
quently acknowledged by courts as redundant and therefore as lacking inde-
pendent legal effect. As such, Gluck and Bressman’s survey raises the possi-
bility that Congress uses statutory redundancies specifically because redun-
dancies provide a statutory location that is best able to satisfy the second 
hallmark of expressive rhetoric: it provides a location to insert text that might 
evade enforcement by the courts.  
Why, then, is Congress adding text to statutes that displays both hall-
marks of expressive rhetoric? Gluck and Bressman’s respondents provide an 
answer: these redundancies, they explain, are built into statutory text because 
“that constituent, that lobbyist wants to see that word” and “because someone 
had to see their phrase in the bill.”45 This is exactly the function that was 
identified in the context of message bills: the function of allowing certain 
constituent groups, either instead of receiving a legally enforceable benefit 
or in addition to receiving such a benefit, to obtain the distinct expressive 
benefit of observing their values and terminology reflected in statutory text. 46  
It is possible, of course, that the constituent “wants to see [a specific] 
word”47 in a statute not because the constituent seeks an expressive benefit, 
but because the constituent believes that the word will have operative legal 
effect that is unforeseen by Congress. Even if this is the case, though, it 
should have little bearing on statutory interpretation. The task of the courts 
is not to discern the intent of constituents. Rather, to the extent that courts 
  
 42 Id. 
 43 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 935. 
 44 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 177. 
 45 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 934. 
 46 See id. 
 47 Id. 
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understand themselves to be operating as “faithful agents” of Congress, their 
task is to reconstruct the intent of this legislative body.48 Gluck and Bress-
man’s respondents reveal this intent with regard to certain statutory redun-
dancies: it is an intent, their respondents explain, to insert gratuitous text into 
statutes in order to award to constituents the distinct benefit of “see[ing] their 
phrase in the bill.”49 In this sense, it is an intent to give an expressive benefit 
directly to constituents and without regard to the courts. 50 
An awareness that Congress might be using expressive rhetoric in en-
acted statutes inevitably raises the question: can (and should) this awareness 
inform or alter the practice of statutory interpretation in the courts? In their 
article, Gluck and Bressman express skepticism on this front, saying: 
Whether this “audience” issue should have an effect on how courts interpret statutes is a dif-
ferent matter—after all, how will courts be able to discern when drafters are talking to them as 
opposed to other audiences? A fictitious interpretive rule may be required precisely because 
investigating the intended audience would be too difficult. 51  
Is it true, however, that it would be prohibitively difficult to isolate and 
identify those instances in which Congress inserts expressive rhetoric into 
statutes? An interpretive methodology certainly can be developed that looks 
for the two hallmarks of expressive rhetoric, after all. If both hallmarks are 
found in the text of a statute, the interpreter can conclude (quite reasonably) 
that Congress inserted this rhetoric into the statute for an expressive pur-
pose—a purpose analogous to that found in message bills and one that ac-
cords with the purpose detailed by Gluck and Bressman’s respondents. 
Such a methodology for identifying expressive rhetoric would consist 
of a two-step process. First, the interpreter would search the statute for loca-
tions of potential redundancy. In particular, the interpreter would seek out 
redundancy-encouraging features of statutes (i.e., structural features of stat-
utes that almost inevitably invite redundancies). A number of these features 
exist, and they are easily identified within a statute. Titles and headings, for 
example, are redundancy-encouraging features, since these features are re-
dundant with the operative provisions that they label. Similarly, defined 
  
 48 For the idea that faithful agency implies a search for legislative intent, see, for example, id. at 958 
n.188 (explaining that “courts fulfill their duties as faithful agents when correcting obvious typos in the 
statute that Congress never could have intended”); Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, 
and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 25, 50 (2006) (“A view of courts as faithful agents of 
Congress is longstanding and seems to require enforcement of actual legislative intent.”). But see John F. 
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2395 (2003) (observing that “[t]he Court has 
long emphasized that, as faithful agents of Congress, federal courts have a constitutional duty to imple-
ment Congress’s ‘intent’” but also objecting to this understanding of faithful agency).  
 49 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 934. 
 50 See id. at 934–35. 
 51 Id. at 935. 
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terms are redundant with their definitions, and examples are redundant with 
the rules they illustrate. 
In the second step of this methodology, the interpreter would search the 
text found in the redundancy-encouraging feature for persuasive evidence 
that it is adopting identifiable constituent groups (rather than the courts) as 
its intended audience.  
In the case where the interpreter identifies statutory text that satisfies 
both steps of this methodology, the interpreter could reasonably conclude 
that the statutory text was meant to operate analogously to message bills, just 
as Gluck and Bressman’s respondents assert it does. 52 The interpreter could 
conclude, in other words, that Congress drafted this redundancy with the dis-
tinct intention of awarding an expressive benefit directly to a constituent 
group, not with the intention of addressing the courts regarding the imple-
mentation of a policy.  
C. Titles, Headings, and Obamacare 
To appreciate the utility of this two-step methodology, consider its ap-
plication to the congressional use of the term “Obamacare.” As of February 
2018, not a single bill introduced in Congress had used the term “Obamac-
are” as a substantive term in its operative text. 53 By contrast, seventy-four 
bills had used the term in a short title, five in a long title, and eight in a head-
ing.54 Within each of these bills, the reference to “Obamacare” in a title or 
heading was paired with a more legally precise citation in the operative text 
of the bill. 55 By using the term “Obamacare” only within titles and headings, 
therefore, Congress used the term only within redundant portions of statutory 
text. In this regard, Congress used the term in a manner that displays one 
hallmark of expressive rhetoric: it inserted this term solely into statutory lo-
cations that Congress might plausibly expect to evade enforcement by the 
courts. 
The other hallmark of expressive rhetoric, it will be recalled, is that stat-
utory text appears addressed primarily to constituents. How is the interpreter 
to find statutory text that meets this criterion? For one thing, if expressive 
rhetoric is understood as having constituents as its intended audience, then it 
makes sense that this rhetoric would adopt the language and categories that 
are meaningful to these constituents, even at the expense of legal clarity. One 
commonsense strategy, therefore, is to look for rhetoric that sacrifices legal 
clarity in order to achieve expressive force with constituents.  
  
 52 See id. at 934. 
 53 Based on a search of https://www.congress.gov on Feb. 20, 2018. 
 54 E.g., H.R. 562, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017) (using the term “Obamacare” in the short title). 
 55 E.g., H.R. 4004, 115th Cong. (2017) (using the term “Obamacare” in the title and the “Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act” in the body of the bill). 
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The term “Obamacare” clearly meets this criterion. It is a term that has 
potent meaning for specific constituent groups. As a New York Times article 
explained, “[t]he act is often called ‘Obamacare,’ primarily by Republicans, 
as a term of disdain.”56 A cultural anthropology textbook has noted it as a 
paradigmatic example of politically charged rhetoric.57 In the current politi-
cal landscape, “Obamacare” clearly is a term that carries great expressive—
and partisan—meaning. 
Moreover, “Obamacare” is a term that achieves this expressive force 
only through a sacrifice in legal clarity. According to the drafting manual 
used by the Office of the Legislative Counsel for the House of Representa-
tives, citations in legislative text should strive for clarity and precision; they 
ideally should “identify briefly a law in an unambiguous manner.”58 Any ci-
tation to “Obamacare” plainly does not achieve this goal. Does such a citation 
refer only to the freestanding provisions of the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act, for example? Or does it include amendatory provisions as 
well—provisions such as those that simply insert text into the Public Health 
Service Act or the Social Security Act?59 Does it refer only to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, or does it also include the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, the companion vehicle used to 
incorporate changes into the health care bill immediately upon enactment?60 
Citations to short titles or public law numbers—as the Legislative Counsel 
drafting manual recommends61—would provide clarity to interpreters who 
must parse the language of a statute and determine its precise scope. In so 
doing, however, the citation would sacrifice the expressive value found in the 
term “Obamacare.”  
In its use of the term “Obamacare,” therefore, Congress sacrifices legal 
clarity in order to achieve expressive force with constituents, and it does so 
in redundant passages of statutory text. This usage suggests that Congress is 
inserting expressive rhetoric for constituents into the titles and headings, 
  
 56 Amanda Cox et al., Fighting to Control the Meaning of “Obamacare,” N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 
2012), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/25/us/politics/fighting-to-
control-the-meaning-of-obamacare.html?mcubz=2.  
 57 GARRICK BAILEY & JAMES PEOPLES, ESSENTIALS OF CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 51 (3d ed. 
2014). 
 58 OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE LEGISLATIVE 
COUNSEL’S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE 47 (1995), http://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/Drafting_ 
Legislation/draftstyle.pdf [hereinafter DRAFTING MANUAL] (emphasis added). 
 59 For sections that are largely or entirely amendatory, see the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 119, 130 (2010) (amending the Public Health Service 
Act); id. § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154 (amending the Public Health Service Act); and id. § 10,501, 124 Stat. at 
993 (amending the Social Security Act and the Public Health Service Act).  
 60 See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES 
IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 213–30 (4th ed. 2012). 
 61 DRAFTING MANUAL, supra note 58, at 48. 
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while it inserts operative legal rhetoric intended for the courts elsewhere in 
the text of the statute.  
This is not the only interpretation available to the statutory interpreter, 
however. Indeed, the conventional view of titles and headings counsels to-
ward a different interpretation. Prevailing theories of statutory interpretation 
likely would explain these references to “Obamacare” in titles and headings 
not by reference to the expressive quality of the term “Obamacare,” but rather 
by reference to a different virtue of the term: its brevity. The Supreme Court 
has endorsed the idea that titles and headings deviate from statutory text 
simply for reasons of brevity, describing these statutory features as providing 
“but a short-hand reference” to the policies outlined in the statute’s operative 
provisions.62 Based on this view of titles and headings, Scalia and Garner 
defend a “Title-and-Headings Canon” that views these statutory features as 
“permissible indicators of meaning.”63 The Court shares this view of their 
permissibility, reiterating it as recently as the 2015 case of Yates v. United 
States, 64 albeit without articulating its theoretical underpinnings.65 From this 
perspective, Members of Congress who use the term “Obamacare” in titles 
and headings deploy this term simply because proper citations would prevent 
the title or heading from being sufficiently succinct. 
There are several difficulties with this conventional interpretation, how-
ever. First, there are more precise alternatives available if Congress’s goal is 
simply to achieve brevity—alternatives that Congress has employed else-
where in introduced bills. 66 Second, if the term “Obamacare” was being cho-
sen for its brevity rather than for its expressive capacity, then there should 
not be a partisan divide in the use of this term. By contrast, all eighty-two of 
the bills that deployed the term “Obamacare” were introduced by Republi-
cans. 67 Third, several of the bills that employ the term “Obamacare” surround 
the term with additional rhetoric that plainly is meant to highlight the expres-
sive nature of this term. 68 In the “Stop Obamacare’s Risky Provisions Act”69 
and the “Safeguarding Children Harmed by Obamacare’s Onerous Levies 
  
 62 Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528 (1947). Scalia and Garner 
describe this case as “[t]he classic statement about the use of statutory titles and headings in American 
law.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 221.  
 63 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 221. 
 64 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). 
 65 See id. at 1083. 
 66 E.g., S. 1642 § 1, 113th Cong. (2013) (referring to “the Affordable Care Act” in the short title); 
H.R. 45, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013) (referring to “Health Care-Related Provisions in the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010” in section and subsection headings); H.R. 5417, 111th Cong. § 1 
(2010) (referring to “PPACA and HCERA” in the section heading). 
 67 E.g., H.R. 4004, 115th Cong. (2017) (amending “the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
to require employees of the White House to enroll in Obamacare”; introduced by Rep. Bill Posey, R–FL).  
 68 E.g., H.R. 3985, 113th Cong. (2014) (using the short title “Stop Obamacare’s Risky Provisions 
Act”). 
 69 H.R. 3985, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 
2018] WHEN COURTS SHOULD IGNORE STATUTORY TEXT 471 
Act,” 70 for example, the descriptions of the Act’s provisions as “risky” and 
“onerous” clearly are designed to underscore and extend the expressive qual-
ity of the term “Obamacare.”71 
Consequently, there is good reason to think that the term “Obamacare” 
was chosen for its expressive quality, not for its operative legal quality—the 
same quality that was the impetus behind the “message bills” discussed in 
the foregoing pages. Meanwhile, since the references to the health care law 
in the operative text of these bills are more legally precise but less expressive, 
it is reasonable to assume that these references were intended as operative 
legal rhetoric—which is to say, as an attempt to translate the concept of 
“Obamacare” into a precise citation to be applied by the courts. 
In this regard, bills referencing “Obamacare” are not anomalous. Con-
sider two examples that were enacted into law: the “Animal Enterprise Ter-
rorism Act” 72 and the “Helping Heroes Fly Act.”73 Each of these Acts pro-
vides a short title that contains a highly expressive but legally imprecise term 
(“terrorism” and “heroes,” respectively74), and neither Act uses that expres-
sive term in operative text. 
As such, the use of “Obamacare” in titles and headings, alongside the 
use of “Public Law 111-148” and “Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act” in operative text, begins to illustrate a new view of statutes. According 
to this view, bills sometimes appear as fractured texts. They are internally 
divided—using several different forms of rhetoric, each of which addresses 
a different intended audience. 
D. Example Clauses and the Rule Against Redundancy 
Another redundancy-encouraging feature of statutes similarly is worth 
examining: example clauses. Example clauses serve a specific function: they 
provide one or more concrete examples to illustrate a general rule that is 
stated elsewhere in the statutory text. 75 As such, example clauses are struc-
tural features that invite redundancy, thus satisfying one step of the two-step 
methodology used to identify expressive rhetoric in statutes. (Moreover, they 
were specifically mentioned by a statutory drafter in Gluck and Bressman’s 
survey as a location for expressive rhetoric. 76) Under the two-step 
  
 70 H.R. 2443, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 71 See H.R. 3985 § 1; H.R. 2443 § 1. 
 72 Pub. L. No. 109-374, 120 Stat. 2652 (2006). 
 73 Pub. L. No. 113-27, 127 Stat. 503 (2013). 
 74 See Helping Heroes Fly Act § 1, 127 Stat. at 503; Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act § 1, 120 Stat. 
at 2652. 
 75 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 22, at 454–56 (explaining the purpose of example clauses but 
referring to them as “statutory lists”). 
 76 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 934 (quoting a drafter who said that “sometimes the lists 
are in there to satisfy groups”). 
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methodology, therefore, it is necessary to ask of any example clause: does its 
rhetoric indicate that its drafters intended it to address constituents rather than 
courts? 
To illustrate the process that interpreters can use to answer this question, 
the following pages examine two pieces of congressional legislation. For 
each piece of legislation, the following pages ask two questions. First, do the 
example clauses in the legislation, at the expense of legal clarity, uses lan-
guage and categories that are meaningful to a specific interest group? Second, 
does the most commonsense and compelling interpretation emerge when the 
example clause is viewed as expressive rhetoric? By answering these ques-
tions, the following pages aim to show, interpreters can check whether an 
example clause contains language that its drafters hoped would address con-
stituents, not courts. 
1. H.R. 575 
Consider the example clauses found in H.R. 575,77 as introduced in the 
113th Congress. While this bill was not reported out of committee, it none-
theless provides a helpful illustration of the drafting practices in the modern 
Congress. It focuses upon a specific concern: the worry that participation by 
the United States in international agreements and organizations might some-
how compromise the rights afforded to individuals by the Constitution.78 The 
bill addresses this concern in two different ways. First, it expresses the sense 
of Congress that, inter alia, “the United States should not adopt any treaty 
that . . . abridges the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, 
such as the right to keep and bear arms.”79 Second, it conditions United Na-
tions funding upon a presidential certification that the United Nations has not 
made any effort to “restrict . . . or otherwise adversely infringe on the rights 
of individuals in the United States to possess a firearm or ammunition . . . or 
abridge any of the other constitutionally protected rights of citizens of the 
United States.”80 
Each of these two references to Second Amendment rights—references 
to “the right to keep and bear arms” and to the right “to possess a firearm or 
ammunition”—operates as an example clause, since each illustrates a broader 
legal rule that applies to all rights under the Constitution. Does the text found 
in these example clauses, then, provide persuasive evidence that the intended 
audience of this text was constituents, not courts? 
  
 77 Second Amendment Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 575, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 78 Id. § 2. 
 79 Id. § 2(b). 
 80 Id. § 3(b). 
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a. Test #1: Language and Categories Specific to an Interest 
Group 
The foregoing pages have outlined one test that can be used to answer 
this question. According to this test, when the rhetoric employed in a redun-
dancy-encouraging feature speaks in the language and categories that are 
uniquely meaningful to a constituent group, even at the expense of legal clar-
ity, this signals the possibility that the rhetoric is directed toward that con-
stituent group rather than toward the courts. 
In the case of H.R. 575, each example clause specifically references a 
topic—the Second Amendment—that is extremely important to a formidable 
partisan constituent group (namely, the gun lobby). The National Rifle As-
sociation, for example—which has been described in the New York Times as 
“the fiercest lobby in Washington”81—describes itself as “America’s fore-
most defender of Second Amendment rights.”82 Another member of the gun 
lobby, Gun Owners of America, similarly describes itself as “a non-profit 
lobbying organization formed . . . to preserve and defend the Second Amend-
ment rights of gun owners.”83 In H.R. 575, the Member who introduced the 
bill twice chose to include an example that made explicit mention of this 
Second Amendment right, 84 even though these references bear an unclear re-
lationship to the broader reference to “rights guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution,” thereby decreasing the legal clarity of the bill. The example 
clauses in H.R. 575, therefore, use the language and categories that are deeply 
meaningful to a specific constituent group, and they do so at the expense of 
the legal clarity of the bill. 
b. Test #2: Comparative Strength of Competing Interpretations 
A second test also is useful in the effort to determine the intended audi-
ence for example clauses. According to this test, competing interpretations 
of the redundant provision are placed side-by-side: on the one hand, any in-
terpretations that presume the provision to address the courts (as operative 
legal rhetoric), and on the other hand, a competing interpretation that views 
the provision as addressed to constituent groups (as expressive rhetoric). 
Comparing these options, the interpreter then selects the more logical, com-
pelling, and commonsense interpretation. 
  
 81 Gail Collins, Congress, up in Arms, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
05/06/opinion/06gcollins.html.  
 82 A Brief History of the NRA, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N, https://home.nra.org/about-the-nra/ (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2018).  
 83 About Gun Owners of America, Gun Owners of Am., http://gunowners.org/protect.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2018). 
 84 159 CONG. REC. H412 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2013) (statement of Rep. Stockman). 
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i. Interpretation #1: Belt-and-Suspenders Function 
What interpretations are available, then, of the example clauses in H.R. 
575? According to one interpretation—which might be described as the 
“belt-and-suspenders” interpretation—these example clauses serve no inde-
pendent purpose at all. This interpretive possibility has been outlined by 
Scalia and Garner, who assert that “[s]ometimes drafters do repeat them-
selves and do include words that add nothing of substance, either out of a 
flawed sense of style or to engage in the ill-conceived but lamentably com-
mon belt-and-suspenders approach.”85 Even at its most generous, this inter-
pretive approach finds only a nominal purpose in redundancy-encouraging 
features; it views these features as misguided efforts to address an anxiety 
that stating a legal rule once will not suffice. As such, the “belt-and-suspend-
ers” interpretation accepts the fact that some statutory text lacks operative 
legal effect, but it refuses to consider the possibility that this rhetoric is suc-
cessfully serving other rhetorical purposes in the statute. 
When applied to H.R. 575, this interpretive approach views the bill’s 
example clauses as serving no independent function in the statute—and thus 
as violating the rule against surplusage. In order to explain this breakdown 
of a semantic canon, this interpretation essentially relies on an accusation 
that, in the case of H.R. 575, sloppy drafting occurred; it assumes that this 
redundant text resulted from a “flawed sense of style” or an “ill-conceived” 
drafting approach on the part of the statute’s drafters. 86 When an interpreta-
tion must take recourse to accusations of sloppy drafting in order to redeem 
its interpretive methodology, however, it raises serious questions of whether 
it might be the methodology, not the statute, that is the core problem. 
ii. Interpretation #2: Clarifying Function 
A second interpretation views the example clauses in H.R. 575 as clar-
ifying some potential ambiguity that exists in the statute’s operative legal 
rule. According to this interpretation, the drafters of H.R. 575 entertained 
apprehensions that the reference to “rights guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution” did not clearly apply to the Second Amendment. In response 
to this apprehension, the argument goes, the drafters inserted the example 
clauses into the statute. This interpretation views the example clauses in H.R. 
575 as operative legal rhetoric, and because it discovers an operative 
  
 85 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 176–77.  
 86 See also Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 812 (1983). (“No one would suggest that judicial opinions or academic articles 
contain no surplusage; are these documents less carefully prepared than statutes? There is no evidence for 
this improbable proposition; what evidence we have, much of it from the statutes themselves, is to the 
contrary.”). 
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function that these clauses perform, it avoids accusations of redundancy. In 
this regard, the interpretation relies upon an idea also commonly seen in the 
application of the ejusdem generis canon: the idea that examples are nonre-
dundant when they clarify some aspect of a broader operative legal rule. 87 
What ambiguity might exist in the reference to “rights guaranteed by 
the United States Constitution,” however, that could be clarified by an addi-
tional reference to the “right to keep and bear arms”? The only serious pos-
sibility, it would seem, is that the statute’s drafters were concerned that there 
might be ambiguity as to whether the reference to “the United States Consti-
tution” applied to successful constitutional amendments. According to this 
interpretation, the drafters included the reference to Second Amendment 
rights in order to clarify that they did, in fact, intend to refer also to these 
amendments.  
There are several reasons why this interpretation is not compelling, 
however. First, it interprets Congress as having devised a circuitous and un-
clear way to communicate a simple idea. Congress easily could have referred 
to “the United States Constitution (including amendments made to such Con-
stitution),” for example. Moreover, this interpretation ignores the fact that, in 
the context of statutes, the House of Representatives follows a drafting prac-
tice whereby any reference to a statute is presumed to include amendments 
made to that statute, even in the absence of a clarifying parenthetical. 88 This 
presumption would be heightened only for constitutional amendments, since 
the Constitution directs that such amendments “shall be valid to all Intents 
and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution.”89  
Second, this interpretation is troublingly out of step with the real-world 
context that produced H.R. 575. According to the Center for Responsive Pol-
itics, a nonprofit organization that compiles documents filed by organizations 
regarding their lobbying activities, three groups lobbied with respect to H.R. 
575: Gun Owners of America, National Association for Gun Rights, and the 
National Rifle Association (NRA). 90 This bill was a reintroduction of a 2011 
bill, and three groups had lobbied with respect to that earlier version: the 
NRA, Gun Owners of America, and Citizens Committee for the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms. 91 In other words, every organization that lobbied Con-
gress with respect to H.R. 575 is an organization that focuses specifically on 
the right that is referenced in the example clauses. This perfect congruence 
between lobbying activity and statutory text is unlikely to be coincidence, 
and an interpretation that cannot account for it ought to be considered uncon-
vincing. 
  
 87 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 199–200. 
 88 DRAFTING MANUAL, supra note 58, at 49.  
 89 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 90 Clients Lobbying on H.R.575: Second Amendment Protection Act of 2013, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/billsum.php?id=hr575-113 (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). 
 91 Clients Lobbying on H.R.3594: Second Amendment Protection Act of 2011, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/billsum.php?id=hr3594-112 (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). 
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iii. Interpretation #3: Expressive Function  
Finally, the example clauses in H.R. 575 can be interpreted as expres-
sive rhetoric. Unlike the interpretation that views the example clauses in H.R. 
575 as serving a clarifying function, this interpretation is able to account for 
the overlap between statutory text and lobbying activity. According to this 
interpretation, rhetoric relating to the Second Amendment was inserted into 
the statute in order to afford a distinct nonlegislative benefit to the groups 
that lobbied with respect to H.R. 575—the benefit of seeing their specific 
concern echoed in statutory text. 
At the same time, an interpretation that views the example clauses in 
H.R. 575 as expressive rhetoric does not suffer from the weakness observed 
in the “belt-and-suspenders” interpretation, as the former does not violate the 
basic principle that animates the rule against surplusage. The linguistic in-
sight behind the rule against surplusage, it must be recalled, is that every 
word and phrase generally is intended to achieve a distinct rhetorical effect, 
not a distinct legal effect. 92 It is only when we layer this commonsense in-
sight upon another presumption—the presumption that the only rhetorical ef-
fects statutes seek to achieve are operative legal effects—that we get the oft-
repeated interpretive rule. The interpretation of the example clauses in H.R. 
575 as expressive rhetoric does not attribute any distinctive legal effect to 
these clauses. However, it does discover a unique rhetorical purpose that is 
fulfilled by these clauses—a purpose that was not fulfilled by the legal rule 
in the statute. In this regard, the interpretation of these example clauses as 
expressive rhetoric respects the basic linguistic idea behind the rule against 
surplusage. This is something that the “belt-and-suspenders” interpretation is 
not able to accomplish—and, for this reason, the interpretation of the exam-
ple clauses in H.R. 575 as expressive rhetoric should be viewed as preferable. 
2. Public Law 109-464 
Finally, it is worthwhile to consider a subset of example clauses: multi-
ple-item example clauses that precede a broader rule. Among statutory inter-
preters, this subset is treated uniquely. The ejusdem generis canon is applied 
to these clauses, a canon that directs: “[W]hen a general word or phrase fol-
lows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to in-
clude only items of the same class as those listed.” 93  
Why have interpreters embraced this canon? The answer to this question 
is found, once again, in the rule against surplusage. The ejusdem generis 
  
 92 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 174 (“This is true not just of legal texts but of all sensible 
writing: ‘Whenever a reading arbitrarily ignores linguistic components or inadequately accounts for them, 
the reading may be presumed improbable.’” (quoting E.D. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 236 
(1967))). 
 93 Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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canon ostensibly assigns a distinct operative legal function to both a broader 
rule and an example clause: the rule establishes an unclear category, while 
the multiple-item example clause clarifies which of the possible interpreta-
tions of the rule was intended. As such, this canon begins with a redundancy-
encouraging feature—an example clause—and it discovers an interpretation 
of this feature that renders it nonredundant. 
However, this Article has advanced another interpretive strategy that is 
similarly able to interpret example clauses as nonredundant. According to 
this interpretation, the example clause sends an expressive message to con-
stituents—a function that the comprehensive statutory rule, as operative legal 
rhetoric, does not accomplish. Interpreters must choose, therefore, between 
two different interpretive options, each of which can explain this subset of 
example clauses in a nonredundant fashion.  
The two-step methodology, as outlined above, provides a reasoned way 
for interpreters to make this choice. This methodology directs interpreters to 




(1) It is located in a redundancy-encouraging feature of the statute. 
 
(2) It is designed to speak to constituents, not courts, as proven by pass-
ing the following tests: 
 
(a) It speaks in language that is meaningful to relevant constituent 
groups, and thereby sacrifices legal clarity; and 
 
(b) A side-by-side comparison of competing interpretations finds 
that the interpretation as expressive rhetoric produces a more 
logical, compelling, and commonsense interpretation than does 
any interpretation as operative legal rhetoric.  
 
 
Consider the application of this methodology to Public Law 109-464. 
This statute serves primarily to prohibit protests and other disruptions of fu-
nerals and memorial services for veterans and active members of the mili-
tary. 95 The Act specifies locations within which these disruptions are not per-
mitted, including: “a road, pathway, or other route of ingress to or egress 
from the location of such funeral.”96 In this passage, Congress provides a list 
of two specific examples: a “road [or] pathway” to a funeral. 97 At the same 
  
 94 See supra Section I.B. 
 95 18 U.S.C. § 1388(a) (2012). 
 96 Id. § 1388(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
 97 Id. 
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time, Congress also provides a broader rule referring to “route[s] of ingress 
to or egress from” such a funeral. 98 The statute thus uses a redundancy-en-
couraging feature, thereby satisfying step one of the two-step methodology. 
This leads to the question posed by step two of the methodology: is there 
persuasive evidence that the example clause is intended to address a constit-
uent group rather than the courts? To answer this question, it first is necessary 
to identify a constituent group that might plausibly be the audience for this 
Act. In most instances, the constituent group will be a special-interest group; 
after all, the general public usually does not have an adequate level of interest 
to look into the details of specific bills, nor does the public (or even its trans-
lators in the press) necessarily have the capacity to sort through the technical 
details of these statutes. Public Law 109-464 may provide an exception to 
this general rule, however. This Act provided Congress’s response to a phe-
nomenon that had received extensive national news coverage and that had 
provoked national outrage: the phenomenon whereby members of the 
Westboro Baptist Church, an organization that viewed the death of American 
soldiers as a divine rebuke of America’s tolerance of homosexuality, would 
stage loud, visible protests at military funerals while carrying signs with slo-
gans such as “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” and “God Hates Fags.”99 As 
such, Public Law 109-464 responded not to the preferences or concerns of a 
narrow interest group, but rather to widespread public indignation at the prac-
tices of the Westboro Baptist Church.100 In this regard, the constituent group 
addressed by Public Law 109-464 consisted of a public that had learned about 
the protests staged by this church through various news reports. 101  
a. Test #1: Language and Categories Specific to Interest 
Group 
Is there compelling evidence, then, that the examples provided in the 
statute are designed to address the public rather than the courts? For one 
thing, the provided examples do, in fact, speak in the language and categories 
that were meaningful to a public that had learned about the Westboro Baptist 
Church protests through national news coverage. The examples provided in 
Public Law 109-464 applied to protests staged on “road[s] [and] path-
way[s].” 102 In the national news coverage of these protests, the iconic images 
repeatedly presented to the public depicted Westboro Baptist Church 
  
 98 Id. 
 99 HISTORIC DOCUMENTS OF 2011, 147–48 (Heather Kerrigan ed., 2013). 
 100 See 152 CONG. REC. H9198–99 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2006). 
 101 At least one Member of Congress made this context explicit on the floor, mentioning the 
Westboro Baptist Church by name. See id. 
 102 18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
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protesters lining the roads and sidewalks that led to and from military funer-
als. 103 These reports described protesters taunting bereaved family members 
as they journeyed toward funeral sites on these pathways.104 Statutory refer-
ences to “roads [and] pathways” conjured these powerful images that the me-
dia had been depicting to the public. Moreover, these terms spoke in the eve-
ryday language that members of the public use to describe these routes—a 
rhetorical contrast with the stilted reference to “ingress . . . or egress” found 
in the statute’s general rule. 105 
It seems logical, therefore, that the examples found in Public Law 109-
464 adopted language and categories that were designed to resonate with a 
public that thought in those terms—and that had learned about the issue ad-
dressed by the Act through unsettling images of protesters at those specific 
sites. Further, this expressive quality was achieved only through a sacrifice 
in legal clarity. In particular, the reference to “pathways” is remarkably im-
precise. In these regards, it is reasonable to conclude that these examples 
were written with constituents, not the courts, as the intended audience. 
b. Test #2: Assessing the Comparative Strength of Competing 
Interpretations 
Another strategy for identifying the intended audience of statutory text 
is to conduct a side-by-side comparison of competing interpretations. What 
does this strategy reveal about Public Law 109-464? 
i. Interpretation #1: Expressive Rhetoric 
An interpretation that regards the examples in Public Law 109-464 as 
expressive rhetoric produces a commonsense interpretation that does indeed 
respect the semantic canons. According to this interpretation, the examples 
speak in expressive rhetoric to a general public that had become outraged by 
news reports of the church’s protests, while the broader rule spoke in opera-
tive legal rhetoric to the courts. This interpretation suggests that Congress 
produced a commonsense legal rule—namely, that protests would not be al-
lowed on “route[s] of ingress to or egress from” military funerals—and it did 
not violate the rule against redundancy in the process.  
  
 103 See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Outrage at Funeral Protests Pushes Lawmakers to Act, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 17, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/17/us/17picket.html (describing Westboro Baptist 
Church protesters “[s]tanding on the roadside outside [a military] funeral”); Alan Feuer, Revving Their 
Engines, Remembering a War’s Toll, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/ 
29/nyregion/29patriot.html (depicting roadways as the site of a battle between Westboro Baptist Church 
protesters and motorcycle groups attempting to drown out those protesters). 
 104 See Alvarez, supra note 103; Feuer, supra note 103. 
 105 18 U.S.C. § 1388(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
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ii. Interpretation #2: Ejusdem Generis Canon 
At the same time, the ejusdem generis canon also produces a com-
monsense interpretation that respects the semantic canons. According to this 
interpretation, the examples of “roads [and] pathways” are intended to limit 
the broader category of “route[s] of ingress . . . or egress.” For example, 
since both roads and pathways are routes across land, it might be concluded 
that these examples were intended to limit the legal rule to territorial routes 
of ingress or egress. This might have implications for funerals and memorial 
services held at sea, for example. Through this interpretation, the ejusdem 
generis canon would have produced another commonsense interpretation of 
the statute: that it prohibited protests on all overland routes of ingress to, or 
egress from, military funerals. Moreover, it also arrives at this interpretation 
without violating the rule against redundancy. 
Both interpretations are plausible, therefore—but between these two op-
tions, the interpretation as expressive rhetoric seems more compelling. After 
all, the ejusdem generis interpretation presumes that Congress took a remark-
ably circuitous drafting approach in order to express a relatively straightfor-
ward concept. If Congress wanted to apply a statutory rule to overland routes, 
why would it not simply state this? Simply because this interpretation renders 
the examples nonredundant does not mean that it also renders the interpreta-
tion reasonable. The category of overland routes is not such an ethereal, ab-
stract notion that Congress would have difficulty articulating this rule with-
out pointing to it obliquely through a set of examples. Put differently, the 
interpretation based on the ejusdem generis canon views the statutory text as 
bearing only a distant, imprecise connection to the legal rule it is trying to 
articulate. By contrast, the interpretation as expressive rhetoric suffers from 
no such difficulty. 
E. Implications 
1. The Ejusdem Generis Canon 
As the analysis of Public Law 109-464 illustrates, an awareness of ex-
pressive rhetoric in statutes—and especially in example clauses—casts the 
ejusdem generis canon in a new light. In most books and articles that discuss 
the canons of statutory interpretation, the ejusdem generis canon is the only 
interpretive strategy that is offered as a way to interpret the relationship be-
tween an example clause and a rule that follows it. 106 Since this canon gains 
its persuasive force primarily from its ability to explain example clauses 
  
 106 See generally CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 657–70 (William N. Eskridge Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2014); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 
2, at 199–213. 
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without assuming that Congress violated the rule against redundancy, these 
books and articles create the impression, whether intentionally or not, that 
the ejusdem generis canon is unique in this ability to avoid accusations of 
drafting redundancy, and that it should therefore be privileged above other 
interpretive options. Once an interpreter is aware of Congress’s strategic use 
of expressive rhetoric, however, the ejusdem generis canon loses its privi-
leged status. Instead, this canon becomes one of several viable interpretive 
strategies, each of which is capable of redeeming example clauses from ac-
cusations of redundancy.  
2. The Expressio Unius Canon 
The presence of expressive rhetoric in statutory text also undermines 
the validity of another canon: the expressio unius canon. As Black’s Law 
Dictionary describes it, this canon directs: “[T]o express or include one 
thing implies the exclusion of the other.”107 Scalia and Garner argue that this 
canon reflects a more general principle of language usage; according to these 
authors, the canon gains much of its persuasiveness from the fact that it “val-
idly describes how people express themselves and understand verbal expres-
sion.”108 Other scholars, meanwhile, have disputed this claim, arguing that it 
is not an accurate reflection of everyday language usage.109 
Even if the expressio unius canon is based upon an accurate presump-
tion about the ways that people use words, however, that presumption con-
tains an important limit: it will be true only with respect to the rhetorical end 
that the word or phrase is designed to serve. When a legislator chooses to 
include the phrase “right to keep and bear arms” in a statute as expressive 
rhetoric, for example, a statutory interpreter may be justified in concluding 
that the legislator intended to award an expressive benefit only to Second 
Amendment-oriented groups, and that the legislator consequently meant to 
exclude other groups (such as groups focused on First Amendment rights) 
from sharing in that expressive benefit. However, this does not tell the inter-
preter anything about whether the legislator intended to award a legally op-
erative benefit those latter groups. The application of the expressio unius 
canon to expressive rhetoric does not tell courts anything about the proper 
scope of a statute’s legally operative rule, in other words—and when courts 
apply this canon to expressive rhetoric in the effort to glean some insight into 
the statute’s operative legal rule, they are consistently led astray. 
  
 107 Expressio Unius Est Exclusion Alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 108 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 107. 
 109 See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 234 (1975). 
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3. The Noscitur a Sociis Canon 
The congressional practice of including expressive rhetoric in statutes 
also undermines the noscitur a sociis canon. This canon directs: “The mean-
ing of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps.”110 In the field of 
statutory interpretation, this has been translated into a specific directive that, 
in the words of Justice Stevens, “words grouped in a list should be given 
related meaning.”111  
Presumably, the noscitur a sociis canon is used because statutory inter-
preters believe that the canon accurately describes a strategy that Congress is 
using to communicate to its intended audience. Insofar as the canon requires 
an interpreter to construe a term in light of a surrounding list, this canon 
therefore presumes that Congress thinks about the entire list as having a sin-
gle intended audience that will construe the list holistically. An awareness of 
Congress’s use of expressive rhetoric reveals this presumption to be incor-
rect, however. Congress frequently intends that each item in a statutory list 
be received by a different special-interest group, with each listed item speak-
ing in the language and categories that are meaningful to that specific group. 
In such a situation, the noscitur a sociis canon misconstrues the intent of 
statutory text that is written as expressive rhetoric, and the canon should be 
discarded when there is persuasive evidence that Congress is using this form 
of rhetoric. 
4. Theories of Legislators 
Among scholars who study the legislative process, there is ongoing de-
bate about how best to conceptualize the relationship that exists between leg-
islators and special-interest groups.112 Within this debate, no school of 
thought has garnered more attention than public-choice theory.113 According 
to public-choice theory, special-interest groups are the primary actors within 
the political system; these groups seek benefits from legislators in order to 
further their self-interests, and they constantly jockey and negotiate with 
other interest groups to reach political compromises. 114 By contrast,   
 110 Hugh P. Macmillan, Law and Language, Presidential Address to the Holdsworth Club of the 
Students of the Faculty of Law in the University of Birmingham, May 1931, in LAW & OTHER THINGS 
166 (1937). Lord Macmillan famously explained this as “words of a feather flock together.” See id. 
 111 Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977). 
 112 See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 
Q.J. ECON. 371, 396 (1983) (noting that “successful modeling has been an elusive goal,” despite the nu-
merous political-sector models that have been crafted). 
 113 See id. at 371–72 (noting some of the many scholars who have contributed to public-choice the-
ory). 
 114 See, e.g., id. at 372; JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 287 (1962). 
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legislators are viewed as relatively marginal and powerless actors—individ-
uals who do little more than formalize and validate the compromises reached 
by these special-interest groups.115 
Several scholars have responded to the theory’s vision of legislators by 
arguing that it is reductive.116 Legislators also have interests, these critics ar-
gue, and these interests (such as a desire to make positive contributions to 
public policy) often are distinct from those held by special-interest groups. 117 
The congressional practice of inserting expressive rhetoric into statutes 
supports these critics, and it undermines the claims of the more strident pub-
lic-choice theorists. It reveals that legislators have developed drafting tactics 
that can insulate operative provisions of statutes from the expressive needs 
of interest groups—drafting tactics that, by addressing interest group needs 
in one portion of statutory text, thereby open up spaces elsewhere in legisla-
tive text for legislators to engage in more principled policymaking. 
To appreciate this point, recall the example of H.R. 575 from the 113th 
Congress. 118 Three interest groups registered as having lobbied with regard 
to that bill, and all three were groups that focused exclusively upon defending 
and promoting Second Amendment rights. 119 It is not difficult to imagine that 
these groups desired a bill that made specific reference to Second Amend-
ment rights. If this indeed were the case, then the legislator would be faced 
with several options. One option would be simply to produce a bill that cre-
ated a legal rule that applied exclusively to Second Amendment rights. This 
would be in strict accordance with public-choice theorists’ understanding of 
the behavior of legislators. Instead, however, the legislator chose a different 
option: Representative Stockman inserted the rhetoric that the interest group 
desired into a redundancy-encouraging feature of the statute. 120 In so doing, 
he opened up a space within the statute—in its operative legal rhetoric—
wherein he had some autonomy to develop good policy independent of the 
relevant interest groups. As Part III will further illustrate, this is indeed how 
many example clauses find their way into enacted bills. 
In this way, drafting strategies that make use of statutory redundancies 
can be useful to legislators. Moreover, by repeatedly capitalizing on this use-
fulness, legislators shed light on their own goals and interests—and, in so 
doing, they reveal the inadequacy of public-choice theorists’ vision of legis-
lators. As these drafting strategies reveal, legislators possess a concern for 
good governance that is in tension with their perceived need to be responsive 
to interest groups. By dividing statutory text into expressive rhetoric and 
  
 115 See, e.g., Becker, supra note 112, at 372; MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A 
THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS 60 (1981). 
 116 See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN AMERICA 39–40 (1995). 
 117 See, e.g., FENNO, supra note 17, at 1–2. 
 118 See supra Section I.D.1. 
 119 See supra Section I.D.1.b.ii. 
 120 See H.R. 575, 113th Cong. (2013).  
484 GEO. MASON L. REV. [26:2  
operative legal rhetoric, legislators make this tension manifest in the text of 
statutes. And they also reveal the strategy that they have adopted in the effort 
to manage this tension responsibly. 
Once expressive rhetoric is understood as a strategy by which legisla-
tors attempt to carve out locations for good policymaking in statutes, several 
interpretive canons that were criticized in the foregoing pages become even 
more worrisome. In the effort to interpret all statutory text as operative legal 
rhetoric, several of these canons instruct courts to interpret Congress’s ex-
pressive rhetoric as limiting or modifying Congress’s operative legal rheto-
ric. As this Part has argued, such an interpretation fails to accurately capture 
congressional intent. Even more troubling, this interpretation consistently 
fails in one particular direction: it undermines the legislator’s attempt at good 
governance (as expressed in the statute’s operative legal rhetoric) by con-
struing the statute in light of the goals sought by specific special-interest 
groups (as echoed in the statute’s expressive rhetoric). Consequently, the cur-
rent interpretive practices of many courts undo congressional efforts at good 
governance, as these practices allow interest group politics to bleed into por-
tions of statutory text that legislators hope to insulate from such politics. To 
statutory interpreters who view interest group politics as a troubling aspect 
of our political system—and, admittedly, not all scholars view it this way—
the fact that certain canons unintentionally amplify the role of these politics 
should be particularly disconcerting. 
Finally, viewing expressive rhetoric in relation to public-choice theory 
casts new light upon another institution within Congress: the Offices of the 
Legislative Counsel. Some scholars have criticized the public-choice model 
by arguing that it fails to account for institutional changes that affect the be-
havior of legislators, thereby underappreciating new features that reduce the 
impact of special-interest groups.121 Viewed from this perspective, Con-
gress’s choice to create the Offices of the Legislative Counsel, and to con-
tinue using these offices for drafting, can be viewed as an institutional adap-
tation by Congress that reduces the impact of interest groups upon statutory 
text. By having its Members consult with drafting offices that are insulated 
from policymaking (and therefore from the pressure of special-interest 
groups), Congress has effectively created an institutional mechanism that 
prods its Members, during the drafting process, to step back from the expres-
sive rhetoric that interest groups provide and to consider the use of drafting 
tactics that create opportunities for principled lawmaking. In this regard, Leg-
islative Counsel can be understood as a structure of deliberation that Con-
gress has created for itself that pushes it away from a dependence upon inter-
est groups and toward principled deliberation.122 
  
 121 See, e.g., ALDRICH, supra note 116, at 205 (on the complicating role of political parties). 
 122 This view builds on “republican” theories that emphasize the need to structure government so as 
to incentivize or require principled deliberation. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 
Term, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 58–59 (1986). 
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This is a very different view of Legislative Counsel from the one offered 
by Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman in their two-part article 
on congressional drafting.123 For these scholars, the fact that Legislative 
Counsel has no policymaking authority is troubling.124 They believe that this 
lack of authority introduces a problematic disconnect into the legislative pro-
cess—a disconnect between policy and statutory text. 125  
For one thing, this concern underestimates the extent to which Legisla-
tive Counsel is in dialogue with policymakers during the drafting process. 
More to the point, however: since policymaking now exposes institutional 
actors to relentless interest-group pressure, Congress may actually view the 
retention of drafting offices that lack policymaking authority as a way to in-
stitutionalize its interest in insulating statutory text from direct interest-group 
pressure. If so, then the non-policy-making quality of Legislative Counsel 
should be viewed as essential to its role in facilitating the principled elabora-
tion of policy, not as a hindrance to that effort. 
II. DIRECTIVE RHETORIC 
Part I argued that congressional text should be understood as using a 
distinct rhetoric when it displays two important traits: it addresses a unique 
(and nonjudicial) intended audience, and it speaks with a unique (and non-
binding) illocutionary force. Moreover, Part I observed that expressive rhet-
oric satisfies these criteria. Twenty-five years ago, meanwhile, Professor Ed-
ward L. Rubin identified another type of congressional statutory rhetoric that 
sometimes satisfies both of these criteria: a rhetoric that, in keeping with Ru-
bin’s terminology, might be referred to as directive rhetoric. 126 
Since the rise of the administrative state, Rubin observes, congressional 
statutes have commonly operated as “directives” that are aimed toward a par-
ticular intended audience: executive agencies. 127 Sometimes, Rubin adds, 
Congress realizes that it can ensure agency compliance with these directives 
even when they cannot be enforced in courts. 128 After all, Rubin points out, 
Congress has other ways of achieving agency compliance with its wishes—
strategies that arise from the fact that agencies are dependent upon future 
  
 123 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 737–39 
(2014). 
 124 Id. at 738. 
 125 Id. at 737–39. 
 126 Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 396–
97 (1989). Professor Rubin describes a statute that “is cast as a pure directive to the agency, offering 
suggestions and examples without resorting to fixed rules.” Id. at 421. 
 127 E.g., id. at 374 (“[T]he primary implementation mechanism for most modern statutes is an ad-
ministrative agency . . . .”). 
 128 See id. at 377. 
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congressional action in many ways.129 This means that Congress has a power 
to reward or punish agencies in the future based on the extent to which the 
agencies comply with Congress’s present wishes. This dynamic translates 
into a distinct form of congressional power—a power to direct agencies to 
take actions through rhetoric that Congress knows, or at least strongly sus-
pects, will not be treated as legally binding by courts. 
In practice, Rubin therefore observes, Congress sometimes drafts direc-
tives that do not adopt the courts as an intended audience at all. 130 Further-
more, he observes that this rhetoric sometimes speaks with an illocutionary 
force that is weaker than that of a binding command.131 As Rubin puts it, 
Congress sometimes is willing to address agencies through “suggestions” 
and “exhortations,” even though these expressions carry a weak illocutionary 
force and therefore “bear no resemblance to court-enforceable rules.”132 This 
weaker illocutionary force can be understood, of course, as a natural out-
growth of the fact that this rhetoric does not adopt the courts as an intended 
audience.  
In addition to identifying the existence of this directive rhetoric in con-
gressional statutes, Rubin also identifies a few features of statutory text that 
seem to signal Congress’s intent to speak in this distinct rhetoric in statutes. 133 
One such feature is the presence or absence of a judicial review provision.134 
He also notes that the insertion of text into a preamble (such as in a findings 
section, or a statement of congressional purpose), as opposed to in an opera-
tive provision, might be taken to signal a congressional intent that its direc-
tives be interpreted merely as “nonbinding suggestions.”135 Beyond this, 
however, Rubin mostly discusses directive rhetoric as a congressional reality 
without providing guidance to interpreters who seek to pinpoint its presence 
within statutes. 136 
This Part updates and revises Rubin’s observations, revealing the unno-
ticed drafting tactics that Congress uses to signal its switch into directive 
rhetoric. Here, it shows that Congress often oscillates between operative le-
gal rhetoric and directive rhetoric within a single provision of a statute. It 
also shows that Congress sometimes signals its use of directive rhetoric 
  
 129 As Rubin says: “Every year, the SEC must come to Congress for its funding and with its money 
there naturally come a fair number of instructions. This basic power of Congress over the agencies it has 
created is supplemented by an array of others: the power to enact amending legislation that runs counter 
to the agency’s interests; to refuse to enact amending legislation that the agency desires; to confirm, reject, 
or hassle presidential nominees to the agency; and to subject the members of the agency to agonizing 
oversight hearings. All these possibilities enable the members of Congress to exercise considerable power 
over the agency’s operations and thus over the substantive area of the initial legislation.” Id. at 392. 
 130 Id. at 380. 
 131 Id. at 381. 
 132 Rubin, supra note 126, at 420. 
 133 See id. 
 134 See id. at 415. 
 135 Id. at 411. 
 136 See id. at 420–22. 
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through its use of modal verbs that, by their plain meaning, only communi-
cate the illocutionary force of a nonbinding directive. In this regard, Congress 
uses statutory text in much the same way that it uses committee reports for 
appropriations bills—reports that similarly speak only with the force of a 
nonbinding suggestion. Finally, this Part argues that Congress sometimes 
uses the same drafting tactics to insert directive rhetoric into statutes as it 
uses to insert expressive rhetoric into these statutes: it is making use of re-
dundancy-encouraging features. 
A. Drafting Tactic: Modal Verbs 
Congress has developed several drafting tactics that it uses to signal its 
intent to speak in directive rhetoric. One such tactic is relatively straightfor-
ward: Congress communicates the nonbinding character of its directives 
through the use of verbs that, to borrow a term from linguistics, have the 
modality of a nonbinding directive. Within linguistics, modality is the term 
used to describe the illocutionary force that, by its plain meaning, attaches to 
a verb phrase. 137 For example, the terms shall, should, and may differ in their 
modality. 138 Similarly, the terms commands, suggests, and permits describe 
actions that vary in their modality.139 When Congress uses verb phrases that 
express a nonbinding modality, there is good reason to think that Congress 
does not intend for the provisions that are introduced by the verb phrase to 
be implemented by the courts as binding legal rhetoric. 
Generally, these verb phrases not only express the modality of a non-
binding directive, but they also are addressed to the executive agencies over 
which Congress has suggestive power. In such instances, it is reasonable to 
think that Congress indeed attempts to offer a nonbinding directive or rec-
ommendation to the agency—which is to say, that Congress intends to speak 
in directive rhetoric. 
1. Committee Reports for Appropriations Bills 
This interpretation of nonbinding modalities in congressional statutes 
gains support from their use in another type of congressional text: the com-
mittee reports that accompany appropriations bills. As several scholars have 
observed, committee reports assume a unique importance in Congress when 
  
 137 Speech-act theorists would refer to verbs with different modalities as “illocutionary force indi-
cating devices[s]”—which is to say, as verbs that intrinsically carry and communicate a distinct illocu-
tionary force. JOHN R. SEARLE & DANIEL VANDERVEKEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC 2 
(1985).  
 138 See id. at 100–01 (discussing degrees of strength in directives).  
 139 See id. 
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they are produced for appropriations bills. 140 In many instances, the appro-
priations committee wishes to specify how appropriated funds are to be spent 
by the agencies that will receive these funds. This objective is not easily re-
alized, however, because such specification is considered a new act of legis-
lation, and House and Senate rules prohibit the insertion of new legislation 
into appropriations bills. 141 As a result, a practice has emerged whereby Con-
gress regularly uses committee reports as a location in which to express its 
preferences for how appropriated funds will be used by agencies. 142 
Importantly, multiple nonpartisan congressional offices routinely ad-
vise Congress that these committee reports do not function as operative legal 
rhetoric. The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), for example, has 
advised:  
The rule, simply stated, is this: Restrictions on a lump-sum appropriation contained in the 
agency’s budget request or in legislative history are not legally binding on the department or 
agency unless they are carried into (specified in) the appropriation act itself, or unless some 
other statute restricts the agency’s spending flexibility. 143 
Similarly, the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) repeatedly has 
advised Congress that, as one CRS report put it: “Committee reports and 
managers’ statements do not have statutory force; departments and agencies 
are not legally bound by their declarations.”144  
Appropriations committees clearly are aware of this prevailing view. 
The aforementioned CRS report is available through the Senate’s website, 
for example, and the GAO volume asserts (and provides evidence to support 
its claim) that “Congress is fully aware of these dynamics.” 145 
If Congress does not believe that the specifications found in these com-
mittee reports will be legally binding, then why does it repeatedly insert this 
language into the committee reports? The GAO answers this question by 
pointing toward the main implementation mechanism that Rubin identifies: 
  
 140 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 980–82; Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory 
Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 132–34 (2012). 
 141 CLERK OF THE H.R., 115TH CONG., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES XXI(2); 
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE XVI(2), S. DOC. NO. 113-18 (2013).  
 142 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 113-416, at 16 (2014) (four times urging the Department of Defense to 
use appropriated funds for specific purposes). 
 143 2 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-06-382SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS 
LAW 6-6 (3d ed. 2004), http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/d06382sp.pdf.  
 144 SANDY STREETER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-518 GOV, EARMARKS AND LIMITATIONS IN 
APPROPRIATIONS BILLS 2 (2004), https://archives-democrats-rules.house.gov/archives/98-518.pdf; see 
also CLINTON T. BRASS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34648, BUSH ADMINISTRATION POLICY 
REGARDING CONGRESSIONALLY ORIGINATED EARMARKS: AN OVERVIEW 3 (2008), https://digital.li-
brary.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc795680/ (stating that committee reports by appropriations committees 
are “not legally binding”). 
 145 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 143, at 6–7. 
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the threat that Congress might, at a later date, exact retribution against the 
agency for such noncompliance through the denial of funding.146 In support 
of this answer, the GAO volume quotes from (among other sources) a 1973 
House Appropriations Committee report that made this dynamic between 
Congress and executive agencies explicit, which said:  
“In a strictly legal sense, the Department of Defense could utilize the funds appropriated for 
whatever programs were included under the individual appropriation accounts, but the rela-
tionship with the Congress demands that the detailed justifications which are presented in sup-
port of budget requests be followed. To do otherwise would cause Congress to lose confidence 
in the requests made and probably result in reduced appropriations or line item appropriation 
bills.” 147 
The CRS report similarly adds: “[These committee reports] frequently 
have effect because departments and agencies must justify their budget re-
quests annually to the Appropriations Committees.”148 
The nonpartisan offices of Congress therefore interpret these committee 
reports as directive rhetoric. These offices understand the committee reports 
to speak with the illocutionary force of a threatening suggestion, not of a 
binding command, and they view the agencies, not courts, as the sole audi-
ence of the reports. To the extent that Congress is believed to take seriously 
the opinions of its nonpartisan offices, therefore, Congress ought to be 
viewed as using these committee reports as a location for directive rhetoric. 
Several important lessons emerge from this understanding of appropri-
ations committee reports. For example, consider the intentionalist argument 
recently advanced by Professor Victoria Nourse,149 and also by Professors 
Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman.150 These scholars have noted that 
committee reports serve as an important location wherein Congress expresses 
its intent regarding appropriations. 151 Based solely on this observation, these 
scholars have suggested that courts ought to give legal force to the prefer-
ences expressed in these committee reports. 152 Each article has justified this 
  
 146 Id. (reprinting a quote from ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, AND 
PROCESS 238 (2000)). 
 147 Id. at 6–8 (quoting REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS OF THE 1974 
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATION BILL, H.R. REP. NO. 93-662, at 16 (1973)). 
 148 STREETER, supra note 144, at 2. 
 149 Nourse, supra note 140, at 133–37. 
 150 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 980, 982. Gluck and Bressman are careful not to embrace 
the intentionalist model that they outline; rather, they argue that, to the extent an interpreter believes in 
the faithful agent theory of the judicial role in statutory interpretation, that interpreter should reach certain 
conclusions based on the results of their study. Id. at 988 (explaining that “[f]aithful agency . . . does 
provide a helpful lens through which to view our findings”).  
 151 Id. at 980–82. 
 152 See id. at 988–89. 
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suggestion by arguing that, in so doing, courts would capture congressional 
intent. 153 
This suggestion makes sense if every expression of congressional intent 
is taken to be an expression of operative legal intent. Once it is understood 
that Congress uses legislation (and its accompanying materials) to speak to 
different audiences with different illocutionary forces, by contrast, it be-
comes clear that these committee reports, even if they do express one type of 
congressional intent, do not actually aim to address the courts as their in-
tended audience. As such, an awareness of Congress’s directive rhetoric re-
veals that the Court’s disregard for appropriations committee reports, as seen 
in landmark cases such as Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 154 is actually 
more faithful to congressional intent than these scholars suggest. 155 
Committee reports for appropriations bills can be instructive for inter-
preters of statutory text, moreover, as they reveal the drafting tactics that 
Congress uses to signal a switch into directive rhetoric. In these reports, Con-
gress does not use language that attempts to speak in an operative legal rhet-
oric that, according to GAO and CRS, these reports cannot bear. Instead, 
these reports consistently articulate their directives with verbs that, by their 
plain meaning, express a modality of nonbinding suggestion. In each report, 
the appropriations committee “urges,”156 “encourages,”157 and “recom-
mends”158 certain uses of funds. Similarly, these reports do not prohibit non-
specified uses of funds; instead, they usually observe that the committee “is 
concerned” by past agency practices that have used the funds to different 
ends. 159  
The use of a suggestive modality in these committee reports offers an 
important lesson to statutory interpreters. It teaches that Congress associates 
this modality with directive rhetoric—and, specifically, with the alternative, 
nonjudicial means of enforcing that rhetoric that Congress has at its disposal. 
  
 153 See id. at 989. 
 154 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Put differently, the Court in Tennessee Valley Authority perhaps shows an 
appropriate level of deference to the committee report, even though it may arrive at this deference for the 
wrong reasons. 
 155 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 37, at 981–82; Nourse, supra note 140, at 133. 
 156 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 113-416, at 16 (2014) https://www.congress.gov/113/crpt/hrpt416/CRPT 
-113hrpt416.pdf (four times “urg[ing]” the Department of Defense to use funds in specified ways).  
 157 See, e.g., id. at 40–41 (six times “encourag[ing]” the Department of Veterans Affairs to use funds 
in specified ways). 
 158 See, e.g., id. at 25 (“recommend[ing]” that the Department of Defense use funds in specified 
ways). 
 159 See, e.g., id. at 17 (twice mentioning that Congress “is concerned” by Department of Defense 
actions). 
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2. The Mandatory-Permissive Canon and the Congressional 
“Should” 
Congress does not confine its use of these verbs (i.e., verbs that express 
a nonbinding modality) to committee reports. These verbs also are present 
within the operative text of congressional statutes. In particular, Congress 
uses a specific modal auxiliary verb: “should.”160 Despite its location within 
statutory text, this verb clearly echoes the use of similar verbs in appropria-
tions committee reports, where its use reflects Congress’s awareness that it 
is addressing agencies through directive rhetoric. 
Consider the example found in the National Foundation on Fitness, 
Sports, and Nutrition Establishment Act, a statute that establishes a nonprofit 
corporation focused on physical fitness. 161 The Act specifies that the corpo-
ration it created “shall have a governing Board of Directors” that “shall con-
sist of 9 members each of whom shall be a United States citizen.”162 At the 
same time, it also provides that three of these board members “should be 
knowledgeable or experienced”163 in physical fitness and that six of the board 
members “should be leaders in the private sector.”164 It similarly provides: 
“The membership of the Board, to the extent practicable, should represent 
diverse professional specialties relating to the achievement of physical fit-
ness through regular participation in programs of exercise, sports, and similar 
activities, or to nutrition.”165 Here, Congress is distinguishing traits the Board 
shall possess from those it should—a distinction that is underscored by Con-
gress’s mention that the Secretary ought to pursue the final item only “to the 
extent practicable.”166 Congress continues this distinction, moreover, stating: 
“Within 90 days from the date of enactment of this Act, the members of the 
Board shall be appointed by the Secretary in accordance with this subsection. 
In selecting individuals for appointments to the Board, the Secretary should 
consult with [majority and minority leaders of Congress].”167 
In this statute, the proximity of the terms “shall” and “should” under-
scores that the variation in modality is intentional. As textualist scholars 
acknowledge, the rule of consistent usage (along with its companion, the rule 
of meaningful variation) is most compelling when the statutory terms at issue 
  
 160 For examples of this use of “should” in statutes enacted in the 115th Congress, see 22 U.S.C. §§ 
2152j-1(c), 7814(a)(6) (2012); John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, 
Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 226(b)(3), 132 Stat. 1636, 1686 (2018). 
 161 National Foundation on Fitness, Sports, and Nutrition Establishment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-332, 
§ 2(a)–(b), 124 Stat. 3576, 3576 (2010). 
 162 Id. § 3(a), 124 Stat. at 3576 (emphasis added).  
 163 Id. § 3(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 3576 (emphasis added). 
 164 Id. § 3(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 3577 (emphasis added). 
 165 Id. § 3(a), 124 Stat. at 3577 (emphasis added). 
 166 Id. (emphasis added). 
 167 § 3(b), 124 Stat. at 3577 (emphasis added). 
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are proximate to each other. 168 In statutes such as the National Foundation on 
Fitness, Sports, and Nutrition Establishment Act, where Congress oscillates 
between two terms even within the same subsection, it must be presumed that 
Congress included this variation for a reason. Yet the only variation between 
these two terms is their modality—one uses a modality that speaks with the 
illocutionary force of a command, while another speaks with the force of 
suggestion. 
Another example is found in the National Fish Hatchery System Volun-
teer Act of 2006.169 Section 6(b) of the Act provides that “the Secretary of 
the Interior may . . . develop or enhance hatchery educational programs as 
appropriate.”170 Here, the context is a broad delegation of authority to an 
agency; the Secretary is not required to develop these educational programs, 
and in the event that the Secretary decides to develop the programs, the Sec-
retary has broad latitude to do so “as appropriate.”171 Against this broadly 
permissive backdrop, § 6(b) then adds: “In developing and implementing 
each program, the Secretary should cooperate with State and local education 
authorities, and may cooperate with partner organizations in accordance with 
subsection (d).”172 
Here, the proximity of the terms “may” and “should” once again under-
scores the intentional way in which Congress varies the modality of its aux-
iliary verbs. In this instance, Congress highlights the distinction between a 
grant of permission (as denoted by the verb “may”) and a directive (as de-
noted by the verb “should”). Once again, the conclusion must be that Con-
gress is using the latter term to achieve an intermediate illocutionary force—
one that directive rhetoric can bear in statutes on account of Congress’s non-
judicial enforcement mechanisms. 
This use of “should” also highlights another point: that Congress com-
monly uses directive rhetoric in situations in which Congress is otherwise 
providing an agency with great flexibility in its task of carrying out a statu-
tory program. In this regard, directive rhetoric is a drafting tactic that Con-
gress has developed as a response to a feature of post–New Deal statutes 
identified by Rubin. In the modern administrative state, Rubin notes, the ef-
fectiveness of a statute often is determined primarily by its effectiveness in 
providing clear, workable instructions to an agency, a goal not always best 
achieved through rhetoric that has the specificity of binding legal rhetoric. 173 
In the pairing of broad operative legal rhetoric with more specific directive 
rhetoric, Congress uses a drafting tactic that responds to this reality by at-
tempting to strike a unique balance between guidance and flexibility in its 
instructions to agencies. 
  
 168 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 172–73. 
 169 16 U.S.C. § 760aa-4 (2012). 
 170 Id. § 760aa-4(b) (emphasis added). 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. (emphasis added). 
 173 See Rubin, supra note 14, at 388. 
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For those who continue to neglect Rubin’s observations about modern 
legislation, meanwhile, this congressional use of the term “should” once 
again disproves the presumption that all statutory text is written as operative 
legal rhetoric. This point is nicely distilled in the way that Congress’s use of 
the term “should” responds to the canon of construction that Justice Scalia 
and Professor Bryan A. Garner label as the “Mandatory/Permissive 
Canon.”174 According to this canon, Scalia and Garner explain, attention to 
the terms “shall” and “may” allows statutory interpreters to “identify[] which 
words are mandatory and which permissive.”175 In the textualist world inhab-
ited by Scalia and Garner, it seems, statutory text always speaks in one of 
these two voices; consequently, the authors perceive the interpreter’s task 
simply as the sorting of one voice from the other. As such, the “Manda-
tory/Permissive Canon” cannot account for Congress’s use of an intermedi-
ate level of illocutionary force in statutory text—a use clearly seen in the 
insertion of the term “should” into congressional statutes. By contrast, if we 
presume that Congress is using directive rhetoric in its use of the term 
“should,” then passages employing this term become easily explicable.  
B. Drafting Tactic: Example Clauses 
There is another drafting tactic that Congress uses to insert directive 
rhetoric into statutes—a tactic that, as Part I illustrated, Congress also uses 
with expressive rhetoric. Using redundancy-encouraging features, Congress 
bifurcates its statutory directive—in this case, to address the courts through 
operative legal rhetoric and to guide an agency with directive rhetoric. In 
particular, Congress often will use a specific redundancy-encouraging fea-
ture—the example clause—to accomplish this bifurcation. 
A useful example of this drafting tactic is found in the Ricky Ray He-
mophilia Relief Fund Act of 1998.176 This Act required the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to make payments, to the extent that funds were 
available, to individuals who had contracted HIV through the administration 
of a contaminated antihemophilic factor. 177 Section 1(a) of the Act specified 
the individuals who were to receive these payments, and it included any in-
dividual who “has any form of blood-clotting disorder, such as hemophilia,” 
and who was treated with antihemophilic factor during a specified period. 178 
In this provision, Congress therefore provided a single-item example clause 
(found in its reference to “hemophilia”). How should this example clause be 
interpreted? 
  
 174 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 112. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Pub. L. No. 105-369, 112 Stat. 3368 (1998). 
 177 Id. § 102(a), 112 Stat. at 3369. 
 178 Id. 
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Consider an interpretation that acknowledges Congress’s use of di-
rective rhetoric. According to this interpretation, Congress used operative 
legal rhetoric to outline a broad legal rule applying to all individuals with 
“blood-clotting disorder[s].” At the same time, Congress used directive rhet-
oric to suggest its core concern and preferred application to the implementing 
agency—an application that prioritized treatment for individuals with “he-
mophilia.” From this perspective, Congress is seen as affording the agency 
the flexibility to apply the program to individuals beyond those who are Con-
gress’s core concern—namely, to individuals who are similarly situated to 
hemophiliacs, but who technically possess a different form of blood-clotting 
disorder (and, indeed, the agency did ultimately apply this policy to individ-
uals with at least one analogous disorder). 179 At the same time, Congress di-
rected the agency toward its preferred application to hemophiliacs.  
This is a superior interpretation from both textualist and intentionalist 
perspectives. First, consider the textualist perspective. Textualists likely 
would apply the semantic canons of interpretation to this passage, thereby 
hoping to discover an interpretation that accords with the principles of eve-
ryday language usage. The textualist interpreter might wonder: is it possible 
that the example of “hemophilia” clarifies an ambiguity in the term “blood-
clotting disorder”? If so, this example would serve a clarifying function that 
would redeem it from redundancy. Unfortunately for the textualist, however, 
hemophilia is the paradigmatic example of a blood-clotting disorder, not a 
contestable, borderline application. The National Institutes of Health, for ex-
ample, defines hemophilia as a “bleeding disorder in which the blood doesn’t 
clot normally.”180 This would leave only the conclusion that the statute vio-
lates the rule against redundancy. 
By contrast, an interpretation that views the reference to hemophiliacs 
as directive rhetoric not only makes sense of the statutory text, but it also 
does so while presuming that Congress did not violate the everyday language 
practices that are distilled in the semantic canons. Indeed, notice how the 
canons of interpretation fall into place once the example clause is treated as 
directive rhetoric. First, this interpretation respects the plain meaning of Con-
gress’s broad statement that its policy applies to “any form of blood-clotting 
disorder.”181 In this regard, it differs from any interpretation that attempts to 
use the reference to “hemophilia” to narrow the legally binding rule relating 
to individuals with blood-clotting disorders. 
Second, it respects the rule on meaningful variation, as it acknowledges 
Congress’s decision not to introduce its example clause with the term “in-
cluding,” but rather to speak of blood-clotting disorders “such as 
  
 179 Ricky Ray Hemophilia Relief Fund Program, 42 C.F.R. § 130.2(c) (2016) (describing application 
to von Williebrand’s disease). 
 180 Hemophilia, NAT’L HEART, LUNG & BLOOD INST., https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health-topics/he-
mophilia (last visited Oct. 18, 2018). 
 181 § 102(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 3369 (emphasis added). 
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hemophilia.” In congressional drafting, the phrase “such as” is specifically 
used in distinction to the phrase “including.”182 As Scalia and Garner’s “Pre-
sumption of Nonexclusive ‘Include’” canon explains, the term “including” is 
commonly understood to be binding with respect to those items that are spe-
cifically mentioned in the statute as “included” within a catchall. 183 By con-
trast, the phrase “such as” suggests no such binding quality. 184 In this regard, 
while “including” carries a legal force equivalent to “shall,” the phrase “such 
as” carries a suggestive force equivalent to that found in the term “should.” 
Third, this interpretation respects the rule of consistent usage, since 
Congress only inserted references to hemophilia into redundancy-encourag-
ing features within the statute. These references appear only in the short title 
of the Act, in title and section headings, in the name of the relief fund the Act 
creates, and in example clauses. 185 Finally, this interpretation respects the rule 
against surplusage, as it discovers a distinct rhetorical function that is per-
formed by each portion of statutory text.  
Moreover, interpreting the reference to individuals with “hemophilia” 
as directive rhetoric also produces a superior interpretation from an inten-
tionalist perspective. According to the committee report, the central goal of 
the Act is to provide “assistance to the hemophilia community,” not neces-
sarily to a larger population of individuals with blood-clotting disorders.186 
At the same time, however, this report also said that payments would be 
available under the Act to “an individual with a blood-clotting disorder who 
used anti-hemophilic factor.”187 According to the committee’s own account, 
therefore, the committee possessed a policymaking intent to address a core 
concern regarding the hemophiliac community—yet it was consciously ap-
proving statutory text that it understood to create a broader legal rule relating 
to individuals with blood-clotting disorders. 188  
Any interpretation that presumes policymakers to possess a single “in-
tent,” and that turns to committee reports of this Act in search of that intent, 
will struggle to make sense of this legislative history. An interpretation that 
views these policymakers as oscillating between operative legal intent and 
directive intent, however, can easily understand this legislative history as a 
faithful explication of the policies embedded in the statutory text. 
  
 182 From the Author’s experience drafting legislation in the House of Representatives, this rule is 
taught as part of the training of new drafting attorneys. See also DRAFTING MANUAL, supra note 58, at 62 
(“In definitions, ‘means’ should be used for establishing complete meanings and ‘includes’ when the pur-
pose is to make clear that a term includes a specific matter.”). 
 183 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 132. 
 184 Cf. DRAFTING MANUAL, supra note 58, at 62–63 (describing “such” as demonstrative and gen-
erally avoided, while defining “include” as “to make clear”). 
 185 See §§ 1(a), 101(a), 102(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 3368–69. 
 186 H.R. REP. NO. 105-465, pt. 1, at 7 (1998) (emphasis added) (providing a detailed narrative of the 
conditions that gave rise to the legislation and speaking exclusively about individuals with hemophilia). 
 187 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 188 See id. 
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III. EXPRESSIVE-DIRECTIVE RHETORIC 
In some instances, Congress also drafts an example clause that is de-
signed to serve an expressive-directive function—which is to say, an example 
clause that is designed to operate as both expressive rhetoric and directive 
rhetoric.  
A. Denali National Park Improvement Act 
Consider an example from the Denali National Park Improvement 
Act. 189 Among other things, this Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior 
to issue permits for certain hydroelectric projects—referred to in the Act as 
“microhydro projects”—within the Denali National Park and Preserve. 190 In 
the Act, the definition of “microhydro projects” specifies that this term in-
cludes “intake pipelines, including the intake pipeline located on Eureka 
Creek, approximately ½ mile upstream from the Park Road.”191 In this defi-
nitional phrase, the reference to the specific intake pipeline on Eureka Creek 
provides an example clause, since it illustrates the operative legal rule relat-
ing generally to “intake pipelines.” Consequently, it is located in a redun-
dancy-encouraging feature of a statute. This raises the question: does the 
clause also display the second hallmark of expressive rhetoric by appearing 
to address constituents, not courts? Moreover, does it display the second hall-
mark of directive rhetoric—appearing to make suggestions to agencies, not 
binding rules for judges? 
1. Test #1: Language and Categories Specific to Interest Group 
First, consider the possibility that this example clause contains expres-
sive rhetoric. The initial inquiry is whether the example clause uses language 
and categories that are meaningful to specific interest groups, and whether it 
does so at the expense of legal clarity. To answer this question, consider a 
statement made by Stephen E. Whitesell, an employee of the National Park 
Service, regarding an early draft of the Act. In 2011, Whitesell offered a 
statement to a subcommittee of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee. 192 In that statement, Whitesell acknowledged that efforts to ratify 
  
 189 Pub. L. No. 113-33, 127 Stat. 514 (2013). 
 190 Id. § 2(b), 127 Stat. at 514. 
 191 Id. § 2(a)(4)(B)(i), 127 Stat. at 514. 
 192 Various National Parks Bills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Parks of the Comm. on 
Energy and Nat. Res., 112th Cong. 21 (2011) (statement of Stephen E. Whitesell, Assoc. Dir., Park Plan-
ning, Facilities, and Lands, Nat’l Park Serv., Dep’t of the Interior), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
CHRG-112shrg70701/pdf/CHRG-112shrg70701.pdf [hereinafter Various National Parks Bills Hearing]. 
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hydroelectric projects in Denali National Park and Preserve had begun as an 
attempt to appease a special-interest group: a company named Doyon Tour-
ism, Incorporated (Doyon).193 This company, Whitesell explained, had “re-
quested permits from the [National Park Service] to install a micro-hydroe-
lectric project on Eureka Creek,” permits that the Park Service did not have 
authority to grant. 194 Whitesell then explained that certain elements of the 
statute’s text clearly were tailored to this specific interest group—including 
the element defining “micro-hydro projects.”195 How did this early version of 
the Act, then, define “microhydro projects” in the effort to cater to this spe-
cial-interest group? It did so by referring exclusively to the site at which 
Doyon wanted to install its project, defining “microhydro projects” as pro-
jects that used “the intake pipeline located on Eureka Creek, approximately 
½ mile upstream from the Park Road, as depicted on the map.”196 In other 
words, the definition in the early version of the bill contained only the exam-
ple clause found in the final Act. According to Whitesell, it did so because 
this language was specifically tailored to the interests of a special-interest 
group.197 Quite clearly, then, the example clause in the final version of the 
Act—a clause that retained this early draft language verbatim—spoke in the 
language and categories that were meaningful to a special-interest group. 
Moreover, Whitesell observed, this definitional language in the early 
version of the bill addressed Doyon’s specific interest only at the expense of 
the legal clarity of the bill. 198 As Whitesell explained, language elsewhere in 
the bill suggested that the Park Service would have broader authority to per-
mit hydroelectric projects in the park beyond the one sought by Doyon.199 By 
defining “microhydro projects” by reference to the specific pipeline to be 
used for the Doyon project, Whitesell feared, the reference to this Eureka 
Creek pipeline might confuse or undermine the Park Service’s broader au-
thority.200 This would be equally true when the phrase was retained as an 
example clause, of course. The result was an example clause that sacrificed 
legal clarity in order to use terms that were meaningful to a specific interest 
group—a hallmark of expressive rhetoric. 
  
 193 Id. at 31. 
 194 Id. (emphasis added). 
 195 As Whitesell put it, “various elements of the bill as introduced appear to apply solely to a project 
by Doyon.” Id. at 32. 
 196 § 2(a)(4)(B)(i), 127 Stat. at 514. 
 197 See Various National Parks Bills Hearing, supra note 192, at 32 (statement of Stephen E. White-
sell). 
 198 Id.  
 199 See id. at 31–32. 
 200 See id.  
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2. Test #2: Comparative Strength of Competing Interpretations 
This interpretation of the example clause as expressive rhetoric is rein-
forced by the second interpretive strategy for identifying this rhetoric: the 
strategy of assessing the comparative strength of various competing interpre-
tations.  
a. Interpretation #1: Clarifying Function 
Two possible interpretations view the example clause as serving a clar-
ifying function. Under one such interpretation, the example clause and the 
legal rule work in tandem to make clear that the fixture located at Eureka 
Creek was to be regarded as an intake pipeline. This can be referred to as the 
“Eureka-clarifying interpretation.” Under another, the example clause clari-
fies that only fixtures substantially similar to the Eureka Creek fixture are to 
be regarded as intake pipelines. This can be referred to as the “pipeline-clar-
ifying interpretation.” According to these interpretations, the example clause 
would settle a debate, or resolve an ambiguity, either about the scope and 
meaning of the term “intake pipeline” or about the proper categorization of 
the pipeline at Eureka Creek. In either instance, the example clause would 
thereby be transformed into nonredundant operative legal rhetoric. 
There are problems with each of these interpretations, however. First, 
consider the Eureka-clarifying interpretation. This interpretation relies on the 
mistaken idea that there were ambiguities or uncertainties about whether the 
pipeline at Eureka Creek would constitute an “intake pipeline.” Doyon 
clearly felt that the Eureka Creek pipeline was an “intake pipeline,” since its 
preferred statutory language labeled it as such.201 The Park Service obviously 
agreed with this assessment, since a Park Service representative stated in sub-
committee testimony that a simple reference to “intake pipelines” would al-
low for permits to be awarded to Doyon.202 In other words, there was consen-
sus, not ambiguity, about whether the Eureka Creek pipeline constituted an 
“intake pipeline.” Moreover, there was no reason for Doyon to fear that a 
more hostile administration might later reverse this interpretation—the stat-
ute gave the Secretary of the Interior discretion to decide whether to award 
permits at all. 203 So if a hostile Secretary wished to avoid issuing permits to 
Doyon, such a Secretary would not need to adopt a narrow interpretation of 
“intake pipelines” in order to achieve this end. Consequently, an interpreta-
tion that views the example clause as an attempt to clarify an ambiguity about 
the status of the Eureka Creek pipeline is grounded in a false theory about 
the concerns that shaped this clause. 
  
 201 Cf. id. at 31–32. 
 202 See id. at 32. 
 203 Denali National Park Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 113-33, § 2(b)(1), 127 Stat. 514, 515 (2013). 
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Next, consider the pipeline-clarifying interpretation. This interpretation 
views the reference to the Eureka Creek pipeline as narrowing the broader 
reference to “intake pipelines,” restricting that reference so that it applies 
only to pipelines that are substantially similar to the pipeline at Eureka Creek. 
This interpretation is troubling because it assigns to the statute an odd policy 
that none of the relevant parties were requesting. As the foregoing pages ex-
plained, Doyon sought a policy that would have allowed the Park Service to 
grant a permit at the Eureka Creek intake pipeline. Meanwhile, Whitesell ex-
plained, the Park Service also wanted the authority to pursue other hydroe-
lectric projects in Denali Park.204 In the effort to effectuate that policy, White-
sell proposed striking the specific reference to the intake pipeline located on 
Eureka Creek and replacing it with a simple, broad reference to “intake pipe-
lines.”205 
Consider Congress’s situation in light of these facts. It had a special-
interest group clamoring for the right to conduct a specific project. It had an 
agency requesting broader authority so that it not only could allow that spe-
cial-interest group’s project to proceed, but also could also award permits for 
all projects relating to “intake pipelines.” According to the interpretation of 
the example clause as narrowing the broader legal rule, Congress settled on 
a middle-ground policy that none of the parties were requesting—a policy 
whereby the broad category of “intake pipelines” was somehow to be limited 
by the example of the Eureka Creek pipeline. This interpretation of congres-
sional intent is not entirely farfetched. Yet it does not present Congress as 
possessing a policy intent that was responsive, in a nuanced and detailed 
manner, to the feedback it was receiving from agencies and interest groups. 
In this regard, it is not compelling.  
b. Interpretation #2: Expressive and Directive Function 
Another possible interpretation views the example clause as expressive-
directive rhetoric. According to this interpretation, Congress used operative 
legal rhetoric to award the Park Service with broad permitting authority that 
extended to all “intake pipelines” located within Denali National Park and 
Preserve, including the Eureka Creek pipeline. At the same time, Congress 
wanted to assure the special-interest group whose project had given rise to 
the bill that its project would not be neglected or delayed due to this broader 
policy decision. Consequently, Congress added a specific reference to this 
interest group’s project in an example clause. In so doing, it inserted directive 
rhetoric that sent a message to the Park Service, informing the agency that 
Congress expected to see the special-interest group’s project given priority 
and unique attention within the permitting process. At the same time, this 
language also functioned as expressive rhetoric, allowing the special-interest 
  
 204 Various National Parks Bills Hearing, supra note 192, at 31–32. 
 205 Id. at 32. 
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group to see its specific language incorporated into law—thereby assuring 
this group that Congress was attentive to its interests, was responsive, and 
was monitoring the agency to ensure that the group received the permit.  
Under this interpretation, Congress gave each entity precisely what it 
sought. The Park Service received categorical authority to issue permits re-
garding intake pipelines. At the same time, Doyon received not only a path-
way to obtain its requested permit, but also statutory reassurance that its per-
mit would be given priority by the Park Service. 
Unlike the Eureka-clarifying interpretation, this expressive-directive in-
terpretation is not predicated upon a false theory about statutory ambiguities 
that troubled the statute’s drafters and key beneficiaries. Unlike the pipeline-
clarifying interpretation, this expressive-directive interpretation credits Con-
gress with developing a policy that responded intelligently to the feedback it 
received from the two interested parties (the Park Service and Doyon). In this 
sense, a side-by-side comparison of competing interpretations reveals that, 
once the example clause is viewed as expressive-directive rhetoric, a more 
compelling and commonsense interpretation of the example clause 
emerges—one that credits Congress with responsive, nuanced policymaking 
and with error-free statutory drafting. 
B. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act 
Another example clause that contains expressive-directive rhetoric is 
found in the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness 
Act. 206 This Act amended the Public Health Service Act to permit the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services to award grants, contracts, or cooperative 
agreements to provide information to women whose born or unborn children 
have been diagnosed, in the words of the statute, with “Down syndrome, or 
other prenatally or postnatally diagnosed conditions.”207 Specifically, the Act 
sought to provide these women with “up-to-date information on the range of 
outcomes for individuals living with the diagnosed condition, including 
physical, developmental, educational, and psychosocial outcomes,” and also 
to provide these women with “key support services.”208 In this Act, the refer-
ence to “Down syndrome” operates as an example clause illustrating the stat-
utory rule relating to “prenatally or postnatally diagnosed conditions.”209 
  
 206 Pub. L. No. 110-374, 122 Stat. 4051 (2008). 
 207 Id. § 2(1), 122 Stat. at 4051. 
 208 Id.  
 209 “Down syndrome” also is a defined term in the statute—a fact which means that this term is used 
in two different redundancy-encouraging features (since defined terms are redundant with the definitions 
of those terms). See sec. 3, § 399R(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 4051. 
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1. Test #1: Language and Categories Specific to Interest Group 
Does the statutory text, then, adopt the language and categories of spe-
cial-interest groups—in particular, of groups that took an interest in the bill 
prior to its passage? According to its website, the National Down Syndrome 
Society “spearheaded the effort to help pass” the Act. 210 Similarly, Down 
Syndrome Affiliates in Action, a collection of five organizations that each 
focuses specifically on Down syndrome, advocated on behalf of funding for 
the bill in the wake of its passage, 211 as did the National Association for Down 
Syndrome.212 Clearly, a host of special-interest groups were interested in this 
bill—groups that had a unique investment in the specific category of “Down 
syndrome.” 
2. Test #2: Comparative Strength of Competing Interpretations 
What additional light is shed on this example clause, then, by a side-by-
side comparison of the two competing interpretations of the reference to 
Down syndrome? 
a. Interpretation #1: Clarifying Function 
First, consider an interpretation that regards the example of “Down syn-
drome” as operative legal rhetoric. In this instance, each key term in the legal 
rule—“prenatally diagnosed condition” as well as “postnatally diagnosed 
condition”—is a defined term in the statute. 213 This fact undercuts any argu-
ment that Congress inserted the example of “Down syndrome” to clarify or 
narrow the terms found in the legal rule, since Congress already relied on a 
different drafting tactic to clarify these concepts.  
Additionally, the drafting history of this Act reveals that the focus on 
Down syndrome was a starting point for this legislation, not a focus that was 
added to clarify a preexisting concept.214 The impetus for the Act came from 
several articles written by Brian Skotko, the Co-Director of the Down 
  
 210 Our History, NDSS: NAT’L DOWN SYNDROME SOC’Y, http://www.ndss.org/About-NDSS/ 
NDSS-History/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
 211 Affiliates in Action, DOWN SYNDROME AFFILIATES IN ACTION, 1 (Feb. 26, 2009), https://mcmor-
ris.house.gov/uploads/February2009AIAPolicySummary.pdf.  
 212 Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, NAT’L ASS’N FOR DOWN 
SYNDROME, https://www.nads.org/programs/governmental-affairs/prenatally-and-postnatally-diagnosed-
conditions-awareness-act/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). 
 213 42 U.S.C. §§ 280g-8(a)(3) to (4) (2012). 
 214 See 154 CONG. REC. H9919 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan). 
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Syndrome Program at Massachusetts General Hospital, 215 and from articles 
in the Wall Street Journal 216 and the New York Times. 217 These articles sug-
gested that women who received a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome of-
ten were provided with a bleak portrait of the life that awaited them and their 
children.218 The articles linked this bleak portrait to the exceedingly high per-
centage of such women who elect to terminate the pregnancy.219 These arti-
cles apparently were brought to the attention of Senator Brownback, a fa-
mously pro-life Senator, who drafted and introduced the Act as a response to 
these findings. 220 This suggests that the reference to “Down syndrome” in the 
Act was not inserted to clarify a larger category of conditions. Rather, it sug-
gests that this reference was inserted because of a specific and intense interest 
in this particular issue.  
b. Interpretation #2: Expressive and Directive Function 
By contrast, an interpretation that views the example of “Down syn-
drome” as expressive rhetoric easily explains the distinct rhetorical purpose 
of this term. There is good reason, therefore, to conclude that the reference 
to “Down syndrome” was intended to operate as expressive rhetoric.  
Moreover, there is equally compelling evidence to conclude that this 
reference was intended to function simultaneously as directive rhetoric. First, 
the example clause appears within a statute that awards a broad delegation of 
authority to an agency; even the decision of whether to pursue the program 
at all is left to the discretion of the agency.221 As Part II explained, directive 
  
 215 Brian G. Skotko, MD, MPP, MASSGENERAL HOSP. FOR CHILDREN, https://www.massgen-
eral.org/children/doctors/doctor.aspx?id=19069# (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).  
 216 Amy Dockser Marcus, Agonizing Choice: A Brother’s Survey Touches a Nerve in Abortion Fight, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2005), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112829903217058110.  
 217 Amy Harmon, Prenatal Test Puts Down Syndrome in Hard Focus, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/us/09down.html.  
 218 As the American Medical Association additionally put it, the information required by the Act 
“should provide a powerful corrective to the ‘bad news’ typically delivered to pregnant women whose 
fetuses are diagnosed with the tested conditions. A body of research suggests that much of the information 
now supplied is heavily biased, outdated, highly inaccurate, and almost always narrowly clinical.” 
Adrienne Asch & David Wasserman, Informed Consent and Prenatal Testing: The Kennedy-Brownback 
Act, 11 AMA J. ETHICS 721, 721 (2009). 
 219 See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 217 (“About 90 percent of pregnant women who are given a Down 
syndrome diagnosis have chosen to have an abortion.”). 
 220 LETICIA VELASQUEZ, Down, Hero Dad and Palin, in A SPECIAL MOTHER IS BORN 215, 215 
(2011); see also 154 CONG. REC. S1267 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (specif-
ically mentioning the high termination rates discussed in these articles in his statement on the Senate floor 
in support of the bill); 154 CONG. REC. H9919 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan citing 
the same statistic); Kristin E. Blagg, Grad Student Inspires New Bill, HARV. CRIMSON (Mar. 17, 2005), 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2005/3/17/grad-student-inspires-new-bill-pregnant/. 
 221 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8(b)(1) (2012). 
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rhetoric often appears in precisely these instances of otherwise broad dele-
gation to agencies. Second, the legislative history of the Act reveals that 
Members of Congress consistently described the statute in a bifurcated man-
ner. 222 On the one hand, they described the statute as containing a broad legal 
rule that would apply to a woman who receives a diagnosis of a “prenatally 
or postnatally diagnosed condition[]”223 or, more generally, a “disability.” 224 
On the other hand, whenever these Members turned to anecdotes or origin 
stories designed to communicate the core policy concern that animated the 
Act, they invariably discussed the example of Down syndrome.225 An inter-
pretation that views the statutory reference to “Down syndrome” as directive 
rhetoric captures this bifurcated policy intent—something other interpreta-
tions fail to accomplish. 
IV. INSTITUTIONALLY INQUISITIVE RHETORIC 
A final type of rhetoric in congressional statutes is institutionally inquis-
itive rhetoric. This is inserted into statutes in order to solicit opinions from 
the nonpartisan offices of Congress that provide feedback to Members and 
committees during the legislative process. Statutory text directed at these of-
fices is “institutionally inquisitive” in that it operates as a question to these 
nonpartisan offices; it is Congress’s way of asking these offices to provide 
an answer to a question about the details of a bill.  
Two of these nonpartisan offices are particularly notable. The first is the 
Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), an office that calculates the antici-
pated amount that a bill, if enacted, will cost in expenditures by the federal 
government.226 As Professor Barbara Sinclair has observed, these cost esti-
mates can give rise to a procedural point of order and “can become powerful 
political weapons”; consequently, they have become a delicately managed 
part of the legislative process. 227 Since the CBO cost estimate is based on 
statutory text, this means—as Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bress-
man phrased it—that “the congressional budget score has an enormous im-
pact on statutory language.”228 Statutory text often is designed specifically to 
alter the CBO cost estimate, in other words. In this regard, statutory text that 
  
 222 See 154 CONG. REC. H9919 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan) (speaking gen-
erally about prenatally and postnatally diagnosed conditions but highlighting Down syndrome with em-
phasis); 154 CONG. REC. S1267 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (speaking gen-
erally about various conditions but highlighting the large number of pregnancies terminated after a Down 
syndrome diagnosis). 
 223 154 CONG. REC. H9919 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan).  
 224 154 CONG. REC. S1267 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Brownback). 
 225 E.g., 154 CONG. REC. H9919 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan). 
 226 SINCLAIR, supra note 60, at 127. 
 227 Id. at 127–28. 
 228 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 123, at 728. 
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impacts the cost estimate of the bill frequently is addressed, at least primarily, 
to this nonpartisan office. 
The second noteworthy audience for institutionally inquisitive rhetoric 
consists of the Offices of the Parliamentarian in the House and Senate. Each 
of these offices makes the important determination of which committee (or 
committees) will have jurisdiction over the bill in its respective chamber. 229 
Certain details often are included in statutory text in an effort to alter or in-
fluence these determinations. 230 In these instances, statutory text is drafted 
primarily with committee referral, not court enforcement, in mind. 
Institutionally inquisitive rhetoric therefore addresses a unique intended 
audience (a nonpartisan office of Congress), and it does so with a unique 
illocutionary force (the force of a question).  
Unlike the other forms of nonoperative rhetoric, however, Congress 
does not insert institutionally inquisitive rhetoric into locations of statutory 
redundancy, or into any comparable statutory feature that might predictably 
evade enforcement by the courts. It can be concluded, therefore, that Con-
gress does not use pure institutionally inquisitive rhetoric in enacted stat-
utes—and so courts are not warranted in refusing to interpret or enforce this 
rhetoric. Instead, Congress inserts rhetoric that is designed to serve a dual 
function: it is designed to direct the courts regarding the enforcement of a 
policy (an operative legal function) and to solicit an answer from a nonpar-
tisan office (an institutionally inquisitive function). In the following pages, 
this dual-purpose rhetoric will be referred to as operative-inquisitive rhetoric. 
How should the courts interpret operative-inquisitive rhetoric in stat-
utes? Bressman and Gluck provided an interesting answer to this question. 
These scholars argue on behalf of a “CBO canon,” which would direct the 
courts in cases of statutory ambiguity to construe operative-inquisitive rhet-
oric in a manner that would render the implementation of this rhetoric con-
sistent with the presumptions that CBO relied on when developing its cost 
estimate. 231 In other words, they argue for construing this rhetoric in a manner 
consistent with CBO assumptions about how the operative-inquisitive rheto-
ric would be implemented.232  
In defense of this canon, Bressman and Gluck argue that it would accu-
rately capture congressional intent in a way that current interpretive practice 
does not. 233 Bressman and Gluck believe that the CBO canon is faithful to 
congressional intent because, to their minds, Congress’s overriding goal 
  
 229 See DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION 7–
8 (1997). 
 230 For a discussion of these drafting tactics, see id. at 8 (discussing the tactic of “amending a law 
that is already in their committee’s jurisdiction”); id. at 116 (discussing the tactic of “clever drafting of 
bill titles and preambles”); id. at 117 (discussing the tactic of “shift[ing] agency oversight of an issue”). 
 231 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 123, at 782. 
 232 Id.; see also Gluck, supra note 9, at 182. 
 233 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 123, at 782.  
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when inserting operative-inquisitive rhetoric into statutes is to limit the real-
world cost of a bill’s implementation.234 In support of this point, Bressman 
and Gluck point toward a slightly different observation, however: they ob-
serve that the overriding goal of many policymakers when inserting opera-
tive-inquisitive rhetoric is the solicitation of a desired cost estimate from 
CBO. 235 As such, the CBO canon is founded upon an unstated assumption: 
namely, that Congress solicits CBO cost estimates due to its desire to limit 
the real-world costs of implementing this statutory text. 
In effect, this is an argument that the institutionally inquisitive dimen-
sion of operative-inquisitive rhetoric is not an end in itself. Instead, it sug-
gests not only that this rhetoric is designed to solicit a CBO cost estimate, but 
also that this score itself is then meant to serve a further purpose. This further 
purpose, it presumes, is an operative legal purpose: namely, the purpose of 
limiting real-world implementation costs, including through enforcement by 
the courts. In this regard, the CBO canon repeats the basic interpretive move 
that has been the focus of this Article: it observes a congressional action (the 
production of statutory text that solicits a desired estimate from CBO), and it 
assumes that Congress undertook this action for operative legal reasons (to 
constrain the costs of the bill’s real-world implementation, and to use the 
courts in service of this goal). 
One of this Article’s goals is to illustrate the insufficiency of this inter-
pretive move. This Article has argued that interpreters cannot simply assume 
that a congressional action or decision is motivated by an operative legal in-
tent, even when that action or decision relates directly to statutory text. In-
stead, it has argued that it is necessary in this instance to ask what Congress’s 
underlying motivation is for using operative-inquisitive rhetoric to solicit de-
sired CBO cost estimates. Does Congress pursue this goal as part of a larger 
operative desire to control actual implementation costs, including through 
the courts? Does it instead pursue this goal with a directive desire, merely to 
suggest to agencies the preferred amount of expenditures that this rhetoric 
will produce? Or does Congress merely possess an expressive desire to send 
a message of fiscal responsibility to constituents—a desire that might be en-
tirely disconnected from any concern for controlling real-world implementa-
tion costs? 
A broader political analysis would be necessary in order to discover the 
answers to these questions. The Author of this Article suspects that, in many 
instances, Congress solicits specific cost estimates solely for expressive rea-
sons. Regardless, the need for further analysis underscores the central point 
of this Article: that interpreters cannot simply rely on the unstated presump-
tion that congressional actions, simply because they are related to statutory 
text, are animated by operative legal motivations. 
  
 234 Id. (“Given the centrality of the CBO score to the drafting of that statute, construing the statutory 
ambiguity consistently with the assumed score . . . seems an obvious, and more easily ascertainable, way 
for a court to reflect the legislative bargain.”). 
 235 See id. at 764. 
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V. THEORY APPLIED: UNITED STATES V. JICARILLA APACHE NATION 
To highlight the impact that the theory of Congress’s four rhetorics can 
have on the courts, consider the case of United States v. Jicarilla Apache 
Nation. 236 In Jicarilla, the Court needed to decide whether the “fiduciary ex-
ception” to the attorney–client privilege allowed Native American tribes to 
access certain legal documents from the federal government—documents the 
government had obtained pursuant to its management of trust funds on behalf 
of the tribes. 237 The Court held that the “fiduciary exception” would apply 
only if the Jicarilla Apache Nation could identify a specific statutory provi-
sion that signaled Congress’s desire for the federal government to assume a 
set of trust responsibilities akin to those seen in the context of common-law 
trusts. 238 Whether such a provision existed, the Court said, ultimately de-
pended on the proper interpretation of section 101 of the American Indian 
Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994.239 In that section, Congress 
had specified: “The Secretary’s proper discharge of the trust responsibilities 
of the United States shall include (but are not limited to) the following: (1) 
Providing adequate systems for accounting for and reporting trust fund bal-
ances. . . . (8) Appropriately managing the natural resources located within 
the boundaries of Indian reservations and trust lands.”240 
Jicarilla, therefore, would be determined by an issue of statutory con-
struction: the issue of whether the catchall reference to “the trust responsibil-
ities of the United States” in the lead-in to paragraphs (1) through (8) was 
intended to reference a broad fiduciary duty (i.e., a duty akin to that found in 
the context of common-law trusts). 241  
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito found that the catchall term did not, 
and could not, refer to such a broad fiduciary duty.242 In defense of this hold-
ing, the Court said: 
When Congress provides specific statutory obligations, we will not read a “catchall” provision 
to impose general obligations that would include those specifically enumerated. “As our cases 
have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment 
  
 236 564 U.S. 162 (2011). 
 237 Id. at 174 (specifying that “that trust is defined and governed by statutes rather than the common 
law”).  
 238 Id. at 178 (“[T]he Tribe must point to a right conferred by statute or regulation.”). Justice So-
tomayor’s dissent vigorously objected to this holding. See id. at 206. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The 
upshot of that decision, I fear, may very well be to reinvigorate the position of the dissenting Justices in 
White Mountain Apache and Mitchell II, who rejected the use of common-law principles to inform the 
scope of the Government’s fiduciary obligations to Indian tribes.”). 
 239 See id. at 178. 
 240 American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-412, § 101, 108 
Stat. 4239, 4240 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d) (2012)). 
 241 See Jicarilla, 564 U.S. at 177–78. 
 242 Id. at 185–86. 
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which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.” Reading the statute to incorporate 
the full duties of a private, common-law fiduciary would vitiate Congress’ specification of 
narrowly defined disclosure obligations. 243 
In other words, the specific responsibilities listed in paragraphs (1) 
through (8) are responsibilities that trustees are expected to perform in the 
context of common-law trusts. Consequently, if the reference to “the trust 
responsibilities of the United States” in the lead-in to paragraphs (1) through 
(8) referred broadly to all the responsibilities of common-law trustees, then 
those paragraphs would add nothing to the statute as operative legal rhetoric. 
Relying on the rule against surplusage, then, the Court rejected the construc-
tion sought by the Jicarilla Apache Nation.244 In doing so, it effaced many of 
Congress’s goals in drafting the statute—goals that attentiveness to alterna-
tive statutory rhetorics would have made apparent. 
A. Interpretation #1: Operative Legal Rhetoric 
As with the statutes analyzed in the foregoing pages, a side-by-side 
comparison of competing interpretations can reveal the congressionally in-
tended meaning of the American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act 
of 1994—as well as the shortcomings of the Court’s interpretation in 
Jicarilla. First, consider an interpretation of paragraphs (1) through (8) that 
is consistent with the Court’s premises. The proper interpretation of those 
paragraphs, the Court suggested, must view them as operative legal rhetoric 
that contributes a nonredundant idea or rule to the statute. 245 The Court did 
not endorse a specific interpretation of paragraphs (1) through (8); rather, it 
simply asserted that the proper interpretation, whatever it might be, must ac-
cord with these rhetorical premises. 246 
These premises are so utterly out of step with the realities of the statute’s 
production, however, that it is nearly impossible to discover a viable inter-
pretation that accords with them. Taken as operative legal rhetoric, para-
graphs (1) through (8) contain a legion of statutory redundancies—redundan-
cies that plainly were not scrivener’s errors, but rather were intended by the 
statute’s drafters. These redundancies are so numerous and significant that it 
is impossible to locate any clarifying function or distinct legal meaning that 
the paragraphs might contribute as operative legal rhetoric.  
Consider paragraph (1) that was added by section 101 of the Act in 
question. One of the requirements of this paragraph obligates the Secretary 
  
 243 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 
837 (1988)). 
 244 Id. 
 245 See id. 
 246 Id. 
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to “[p]rovid[e] adequate systems for accounting for . . . trust fund bal-
ances.” 247 Members of Congress involved in the Act’s drafting and passage 
plainly did not view this as the articulation of a new, nonredundant legal re-
quirement. For one thing, this “accounting” requirement is redundant with a 
provision that appears on the very same page of the statute. Under sec-
tion 102(a) of the Act, the Secretary of the Interior “shall account for the 
daily and annual balance of all funds held in trust by the United States for the 
benefit of an Indian tribe or an individual Indian.”248 The paragraph (1) ac-
counting requirement differs from this 102(a) requirement only in that it re-
quires the Secretary to provide “adequate systems” to achieve this account-
ing-related goal, an additional element that adds nothing to the statutory di-
rective. 249 Given the proximity of these redundant provisions, Congress must 
have been aware of the statutory overlap, yet it included both. 
This is just the beginning of the ways in which paragraph (1) fails to 
articulate a nonredundant legal requirement. The Act’s legislative history 
contains clear evidence that Congress understood the paragraph (1) account-
ing requirement to be redundant with preexisting provisions in the United 
States Code. 250 A report by the Committee on Government Operations that 
directly shaped the Act’s trust-related provisions251 emphasized that “[t]he 
Federal Government is obligated by statute and treaty to properly discharge 
all its fiduciary responsibilities to native Americans, including accounting 
for Indian trust funds.”252 The report was able to make this assertion despite 
being written two years before the enactment of paragraph (1), a fact that 
illustrates the Committee’s understanding that paragraph (1) would be redun-
dant with preexisting federal laws. Importantly, this understanding also was 
reiterated by Representative Synar, who ostensibly drafted the statutory text 
found in paragraph (1).253  
What, then, about the statutory overlap that was at issue in Jicarilla: 
namely, the potential overlap between the paragraph (1) accounting require-
ment and the lead-in reference to “the trust responsibilities of the United 
States”? Time and again, important Members and committees of Congress 
described the paragraph (1) accounting requirement as one of the federal gov-
ernment’s already existing “fiduciary responsibilities” or “trust 
  
 247 American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-412, § 101, 108 
Stat. 4239, 4240 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(1)). 
 248 § 102(a), 108 Stat. at 4240 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 4011(a)). 
 249 Compare § 101, 108 Stat. at 4240, with § 102(a), 108 Stat. at 4240. 
 250 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 57 (1992) (finding that the government is already “obligated by 
statute and treaty to properly discharge all its fiduciary responsibilities”). 
 251 H.R. REP. NO. 103-778, at 30 (1994) (“[T]o improve the investment services delivered to the trust 
account owners, we are incorporating suggestions made in the April 1992 report.”). 
 252 H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 57 (emphasis added).  
 253 See Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Management of the $2 Billion Indian Trust Fund: Hearing Before 
the Env’t, Energy, and Nat. Res. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 102d Cong. 64–65 
(1991) (statement of Rep. Synar) [hereinafter Indian Trust Fund Hearing]. 
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responsibilities.”254 The aforementioned committee report said, for example: 
“The most fundamental fiduciary responsibility of the government, and the 
Bureau, is the duty to make a full accounting of the property and funds held 
in trust for the 300,000 beneficiaries of Indian trust funds.”255 Representative 
Synar was careful to clarify this overlap in meaning in an exchange with an 
official from the General Accounting Office at a hearing—and to do so in the 
precise language of paragraph (1). The following exchange ensued: 
[Mr. SYNAR.] Can you tell the subcommittee whether the BIA’s internal system for account-
ing for and reporting the trust fund balances are adequate?  
Mr. STEINHOFF. They are not. . . . 
Mr. SYNAR. Those responsibilities of reporting and accounting for those trust funds are crit-
ical to their fiduciary responsibilities?  
Mr. STEINHOFF. Yes. 256 
It is difficult to locate any meaningful sense in which these “fiduciary 
responsibilities” might differ from the “trust responsibilities” mentioned in 
the statute—and, indeed, the Bureau of Indian Affairs used these descriptions 
interchangeably.257 It seems clear that the individuals most deeply involved 
in the drafting and passage of the Act at issue in Jicarilla understood the plain 
meaning of the reference to “trust responsibilities” in the lead-in to be redun-
dant with the paragraph (1) accounting requirement. 
Meanwhile, the Court in Jicarilla identified only one possible interpre-
tation of this lead-in reference to “the trust responsibilities of the United 
States” that could redeem it from accusations of redundancy258—and this in-
terpretation plainly failed to provide the redemption that the Court sought. 
According to this interpretation, the reference to “the trust responsibilities of 
the United States” referred not to a common-law fiduciary duty, but instead 
to the additional statutory obligations of the federal government.259 Yet, as 
Representative Synar’s statement and the aforementioned congressional re-
port make clear, the drafters and supporters of the Act understood even a 
reference to the government’s preexisting statutory obligations to be redun-
dant with paragraph (1). In this regard, it seems unavoidable that the lead-in 
reference to “the trust responsibilities of the United States” was, as a legal 
matter, intentionally redundant with paragraph (1). 
 
  
 254 E.g., id. at 44; H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 7. 
 255 H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 7 (emphasis added). 
 256 Indian Trust Fund Hearing, supra note 253, at 44 (emphasis added).  
 257 Id. at 220.  
 258 See United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 185–86 (2011).  
 259 See id.  
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According to the drafters and ratifiers of paragraph (1), therefore, the 
“accounting” requirement found in this paragraph was intentionally redun-
dant in at least three different respects. House Report 102-499 summarized 
this state of affairs: the Bureau of Indian Affairs, it said, already had been the 
target of repeated “congressional directives designed to provide a full and 
accurate accounting.”260 The problem was not that binding legal statements 
had not been issued to the Bureau that would create an accounting require-
ment. Rather, the problem was that “[t]he Bureau has repeatedly ignored di-
rectives to undertake needed management reform measures.”261 
Similar redundancies can easily be found throughout paragraphs (1) 
through (8). The additional paragraph (1) requirement relating to “reporting 
trust fund balances” was redundant with paragraph (5),262 with the lead-in 
reference to “trust responsibilities,”263 and with existing legal require-
ments. 264 Indeed, Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent: “[N]ot even the 
Government argues that it had no disclosure obligations with respect to In-
dian trust funds prior to the enactment of the 1994 Act.”265 Paragraph (3) was 
redundant with existing legal requirements. 266 Paragraph (7) was redundant 
with paragraph (1) and with section 102(a) of the Act. 267 Indeed, it is more 
difficult to identify a nonredundant provision in paragraphs (1) through (8) 
than it is to locate a duplicative one. 
These abundant, intentional redundancies plainly undermine the Court’s 
interpretation of the statute in Jicarilla. The Court had ruled out the construc-
tion of the statute offered by the Jicarilla Apache Nation, and it had done so 
simply because that interpretation would have prevented paragraphs (1) 
through (8) from serving a nonredundant purpose as operative legal 
  
 260 H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 2.  
 261 Id. at 3. 
 262 Paragraph (5) requires the reporting of trust fund balances, American Indian Trust Fund Manage-
ment Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-412, § 101(5), 108 Stat. 4239, 4240 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 162a(d)(5) (2012)), and paragraph (1) requires the Secretary of the Interior to establish “adequate sys-
tems” to report trust fund balances, § 101(1), 108 Stat. at 4240 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(1)). 
 263 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 7 (“The most fundamental fiduciary responsibility of the govern-
ment, and the Bureau . . . includes the continuing obligation to report to the tribes and individual ac-
countholders about the Federal Government’s management of the trust funds.”). 
 264 See id. 
 265 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 205 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 266 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 58 (1992) (“The BIA’s continuing refusal to reconcile audit and 
certify all Indian trust fund accounts was arbitrary, capricious unreasonable and contrary to the clear con-
gressional intent as expressed in five successive Federal laws governing the BIA’s annual appropriations 
from 1987 to 1991.”). Paragraph (3) stated that one of the responsibilities of the Secretary was “[p]rovid-
ing periodic, timely reconciliations to assure the accuracy of accounts.” § 101(3), 108 Stat. at 4240 (cod-
ified at 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(3)). 
 267 Paragraph (7) requires “adequate staffing, supervision, and training for trust fund management 
and accounting.” § 101(7), 108 Stat. at 4240 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(7)). 
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rhetoric. 268 Yet it appears that Congress had intentionally drafted these para-
graphs in a redundant manner. In other words, some aspect of the logic ani-
mating the rule against surplusage had broken down in the drafting of para-
graphs (1) through (8). 
B. Interpretation #2: Expressive-Directive Rhetoric 
Next, consider an interpretation of paragraphs (1) through (8) that views 
these paragraphs as expressive-directive rhetoric. To begin, notice that these 
paragraphs provide a paradigmatic instance of directive rhetoric. First, they 
appear within a redundancy-encouraging feature of the statute, since these 
paragraphs operate as example clauses. Second, they are addressed to an ex-
ecutive agency—the very audience that Congress addresses through directive 
rhetoric. Third, they are offered in a context that, much to its chagrin, Con-
gress had discovered was a context of broad delegation. Despite the legal 
controls that Congress had previously tried to place upon the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs, it found that as a practical matter, the Bureau almost inevitably 
operated in a space of broad discretion with respect to its management of 
trusts. 269  
Fourth, an interpretation of paragraphs (1) through (8) as directive rhet-
oric is superior from a textualist perspective. As the foregoing pages ex-
plained, there is no viable interpretation that views these paragraphs as oper-
ative legal rhetoric and also respects the rule against redundancy. By con-
trast, an interpretation of these paragraphs as directive rhetoric easily finds a 
nonredundant rhetorical purpose in these paragraphs. According to this inter-
pretation, the lead-in reference to “the trust responsibilities of the United 
States” articulated a broad legal rule, while paragraphs (1) through (8) iden-
tified the specific subset of these “trust responsibilities” that Congress hoped 
to see the Bureau of Indian Affairs prioritize in its attempts to address its 
myriad failures as a trustee. 
Fifth, this interpretation is even more compelling from an intentionalist 
perspective. The committee report mentions paragraphs (1) through (8) only 
once—describing these paragraphs not as binding legal rules, but rather as “a 
list of guidelines for the Secretary’s proper discharge of trust responsibili-
ties.” 270 This statement establishes two tiers of responsibility for the Secre-
tary. On the one hand, it refers to “responsibilities” of the Secretary—a term 
which suggests a set of duties that it is incumbent upon the Secretary to per-
form. On the other hand, it refers to paragraphs (1) through (8) as “a list of 
guidelines” for the Secretary—a description which suggests that paragraphs 
  
 268 See Jicarilla, 564 U.S. at 185–86 (“As our cases have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt 
an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same 
law.” (quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988))). 
 269 See supra note 266; infra notes 271–272 (on BIA ignoring statutory directives). 
 270 H.R. REP. NO. 103-778, at 15–16 (1994). 
512 GEO. MASON L. REV. [26:2  
(1) through (8) are designed merely to “guide” or steer the Secretary in her 
efforts to implement those more fundamental responsibilities. Through this 
bifurcation, the committee report suggests that Congress understood para-
graphs (1) through (8) to be serving a different rhetorical function than that 
performed by the lead-in reference to “trust responsibilities”—a function of 
guiding the agency, rather than (or in addition to) issuing new binding com-
mands to that agency.  
This possibility is reinforced by the fact that Congress did not seem to 
view the core problem regarding trust fund management as having resulted 
from a lack of binding legal requirements. To Members of Congress, rather, 
the problem was that the existence of binding statutory requirements was 
proving insufficient to spur the Bureau of Indian Affairs to action. Describing 
the Bureau’s “failure to comply with congressional directives,”271 House Re-
port 102-499 observed: “The Bureau has repeatedly ignored [congressional] 
directives to undertake needed management reform measures.”272 According 
to the report, Congress’s only success in coercing action by the Bureau had 
resulted not from its binding legal directives, but instead from a different 
strategy that Congress possessed with respect to the Bureau.273 As the report 
put it: “To the extent the Bureau has made any progress in this area, it appears 
that the subcommittee’s continuing oversight hearings have been virtually 
the only reason.”274 If Congress does indeed conceptualize some of its statu-
tory language as akin to a reassertion of the pressure applied in oversight 
hearings, rather than as a creation new, nonredundant binding obligations, 
therefore, it makes sense that Congress would take this approach in para-
graphs (1) through (8). 
Next, consider these paragraphs as expressive rhetoric. Quite clearly, 
there were special-interest groups that were uniquely attentive to the Act at 
issue in Jicarilla: the tribes whose trusts were being managed by the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs. Representative Synar was explicit about the fact that the 
Act had been drafted not only with these interest groups in mind, but also in 
close consultation with them. 275 As Synar put it: “[The Act] was prepared 
with the advice and counsel of many native Americans and tribal officials.” 276 
Did paragraphs (1) through (8) speak, then, in the language and categories 
that were meaningful to them? It appears so. In the hearings that preceded 
the passage of the Act, for example, the controller of the Blackfeet Tribe 
offered a statement to the congressional subcommittee that was investigating 
  
 271 H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 15; see also id. at 56 (“The Bureau of Indian Affairs . . . has failed to 
fulfill its fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries of the Indian trust fund.”). 
 272 Id. at 3.  
 273 See id. at 5.  
 274 Id.  
 275 See 139 CONG. REC. E1017 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1993) (statement of Rep. Synar).  
 276 Id. 
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the Bureau’s trust fund mismanagement. 277 In the statement, the controller 
emphasized three essential areas in which the tribes believed the Bureau 
should improve: reconciliation of funds, performance of audits, and develop-
ment and distribution of accurate account balances. 278 These topics are cen-
tral to paragraphs (1) through (8); they are addressed by paragraphs (1), (3), 
(4), and (5) of the statutory text at issues in Jicarilla. As such, these para-
graphs spoke directly to the concerns that the tribes had voiced to Congress 
prior to the Act’s passage, thereby acknowledging that Congress had heard 
the tribes’ concerns and would prioritize them during its continuing oversight 
of the Bureau. In this regard, paragraphs (1) through (8) also seem to have 
been intended as expressive rhetoric.  
Once paragraphs (1) through (8) are understood to be expressive-di-
rective rhetoric, the Court’s logic in Jicarilla falls apart. The reference to 
“the trust responsibilities of the United States” certainly can refer to the 
broader set of fiduciary duties that are incumbent upon common-law trustees, 
and it can do so without “render[ing] superfluous another portion of that same 
law,” as the Court put it. 279 Indeed, such an interpretation would fulfill the 
vision of Representative Synar, the ostensible author of paragraphs (1) 
through (8), whose core frustration was that Congress had previously “been 
unable to get the responsiveness that we need out of the BIA to perform the 
basic fiduciary responsibilities which we expect out of any trustee.” 280 Instead 
of seriously considering this interpretation, however, the Court simply relied 
on the fiction that Congress had drafted paragraphs (1) through (8) as nonre-
dundant operative legal rhetoric. It is an interpretation that cannot be taken 
seriously by a Court that understands itself to be a faithful agent of Con-
gress—and the sooner this presumption is discarded, the sooner courts will 
begin to genuinely fulfill this professed interpretive duty. 
CONCLUSION 
For much of our nation’s legal history, the rule against surplusage has 
been regarded as a central tenet of statutory interpretation. By and large, this 
treatment has been warranted; the rule expresses a laudatory deference to the 
specific word choices that Congress makes when it drafts a statute and often 
leads to accurate and commonsense interpretations of federal statutes. When 
  
 277 See generally Indian Trust Fund Hearing, supra note 252, at 98–108. 
 278 See id. at 99. As the Controller put it: “[The increasing control of tribes over trust funds] in no 
way diminishes BIA’s trust responsibility. The reconciliation and audit of these funds to a specific point 
in time by a contractor will correct the cumulative effects of the BIA’s poor management up to that date, 
but the accuracies of those account balances from that point in time into the future is dependent upon the 
BIA’s success in developing and implementing a comprehensive management plan staffed by competent 
and experienced personnel.” Id. 
 279 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 185 (2011) (quoting Mackey v. Lanier 
Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988)). 
 280 140 CONG. REC. H10,488 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1994) (statement of Rep. Synar) (emphasis added). 
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the rule is applied without any understanding of Congress’s four rhetorics, 
however, it predictably leads interpreters astray. In response, this Article has 
attempted to shine a light on these different congressional rhetorics. In so 
doing, it hopefully will lead interpreters to constructions of federal statutes 
that are more logical, more nuanced, and more faithful to congressional in-
tent. 
